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I. INTRODUCTION 
For nearly twenty years, Fifth Amendment takings 
challenges to adjudicative land-use exactions and permit 
conditions have been governed by the dual United States 
Supreme Court cases of Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission1 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.2 In Nollan, the Court 
held that a government could, without paying compensation, 
demand an easement as a condition for granting a development 
permit the government was entitled to deny as an exaction of 
private property, provided that the exaction would substantially 
advance the same government interest that would furnish a valid 
ground for denial of the permit.3 In Dolan, the Court followed up 
with the related requirement that the dedication of private 
property must be “‘roughly proportional[]’ . . . both in nature and 
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”4 In its 2013 
decision, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, a 
deeply divided Court held that the two-part Nollan/Dolan test 
applies to a government’s demand for a monetary exaction 
imposed on a land-use permit applicant on an ad hoc, 
adjudicative basis.5 But the majority in Koontz did not address 
 
1. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
2. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
3. 483 U.S. at 834, 836–37. 
4. 512 U.S. at 391. 
5. 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2589 (2013). 
3
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the question of whether legislatively imposed monetary exactions 
are also governed by the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan 
test.6 As the California Supreme Court recently observed: “The 
Koontz decision does not purport to decide whether the 
Nollan/Dolan test is applicable to legislatively prescribed 
monetary permit conditions that apply to a broad class of 
proposed developments.”7 
After Koontz, there is significant uncertainty as to whether 
the U.S. Supreme Court will accept the distinction between 
adjudicative and legislative exactions made by many lower 
courts.8 At least one post-Koontz federal decision (currently on 
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit) applied 
Nollan/Dolan to a legislative exaction, but for the wrong 
reasons.9 Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas aptly noted in 
early 2016: “For at least two decades, however, lower courts have 
divided over whether the Nollan/Dolan test applies in cases 
where the alleged taking arises from a legislatively imposed 
 
6. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., the Court made it clear that the Nollan 
and Dolan cases were decided in the context of ad hoc, adjudicatively imposed 
conditions:  
Both Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment takings challeng-
es to adjudicative land-use exactions—specifically, government de-
mands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public ac-
cess to her property as a condition of obtaining a development 
permit. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379–80 (permit to expand a store and 
parking lot conditioned on the dedication of a portion of the relevant 
property for a “greenway,” including a bike/pedestrian path); Nollan, 
483 U.S. at 828 (permit to build a larger residence on beachfront 
property conditioned on dedication of an easement allowing the pub-
lic to traverse a strip of the property between the owner’s seawall 
and the mean high-tide line). 
544 U.S. 528, 546 (2005) (citations modified). 
7. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 990 n.11 (Cal. 
2015). 
8. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 
2002); Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 443-44 (Cal. 1996); Rogers Mach., 
Inc. v. Washington Cty., 45 P.3d 966, 977 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (“With near 
uniformity, lower courts applying Dolan to monetary exactions have done so 
only when the exaction has been imposed through an adjudicatory process; they 
have expressly declined to use Dolan’s heightened scrutiny in testing 
development or impact fees imposed on broad classes of property pursuant to 
legislatively adopted fee schemes.”). 
9. See the discussion of Levin v. City of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072 
(N.D. Cal. 2014), infra Part III.F. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1
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condition rather than an administrative one. That division shows 
no signs of abating.”10 
Resolving that constitutional uncertainty is of paramount 
importance. Justice Thomas recently warned: “Until we decide 
this issue, property owners and local governments are left 
uncertain about what legal standard governs legislative 
ordinances and whether cities can legislatively impose exactions 
that would not pass muster if done administratively.”11 Indeed, 
Justice Kagan anticipated that uncertainty in her dissent in 
Koontz when she stated: “[T]he majority’s refusal ‘to say more’ 
about the scope of its new rule [of applying Nollan/Dolan to 
monetary exactions] now casts a cloud on every decision by every 
local government to require a person seeking a permit to pay or 
spend money.”12 Due to the widespread concern of that lingering 
constitutional uncertainty,13 Justice Thomas believes that there 
 
10. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of cert.) (citations omitted). 
11. Id. at 928–29.  
12. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608 
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
13. See, e.g., William R. Devine & Kathryn D. Horning, US Supreme Court 
Limits Governmental Power to Impose Conditions on New Development, ALLEN 
MATKINS LEGAL ALERT (June 26, 2013), http://www.allenmatkins.com/en/Public 
ations/Legal-Alerts/2013/06/26_06_2013-Koontz-Alert.aspx [https://perma.cc/UU 
G9-SGQB] (“The decision in Koontz now places in question the continued 
applicability of both Ehrlich and San Remo”); Christopher W. Garrett et al., 
Koontz Decision Extends Property Owners’ Constitutional Protections, PUB. 
SERVANT (Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/koontz-decision 
-extends-property-owners-constitutional-protections [https://perma.cc/Z9V7-YLU 
E] (“It is not apparent, however, that the Court will accept the distinction drawn 
by the California Supreme Court in Ehrlich, and it could apply the Koontz 
protections broadly”; the majority opinion in Koontz “leaves open the level of 
scrutiny to which legislatively imposed fess [sic] with [sic] now be subject”); 
Mitchell B. Menzer & Karen Michail Shah, Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Management District: The United States Supreme Court Expands Fifth 
Amendment Takings Protections To Limit Monetary Exactions in Land Use 
Matters, PAUL HASTINGS BLOG (July 16, 2013), https://www.paulhastings.com/ 
publications-items/details/?id=9e09de69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbde [https://per 
ma.cc/QSA3-3SRN] (“The major question left unanswered by Koontz is whether 
Nollan/Dolan apply to fees and exactions imposed through legislation of general 
application. . . . It remains to be seen whether the Nollan and Dolan restrictions 
are eventually extended to legislatively adopted, generally applicable 
exactions.”); Jack J. Kubiszyn et al., Supreme Court Rules In Favor of 
Landowner Seeking to Develop Property, BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP, 
REAL EST. NEWSL. (July 12, 2013), http://www.babc.com/supreme-court-rules-in-
favor-of-landowner-seeking-to-develop-property-07-12-2013/ 
5
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are “compelling reasons for resolving this conflict at the earliest 
practicable opportunity.”14 
This article explains why the Nollan/Dolan test should not 
apply to legislatively imposed exactions, provided that such 
exactions satisfy two key criteria: (1) the exaction is generally-
applied; and (2) the exaction is applied based on a set legislative 
formula without any meaningful administrative discretion in that 
application. Legislative exactions that fail to meet those two 
criteria should be governed by the Nollan/Dolan standard of 
review in the same manner as the ad hoc adjudicative exaction in 
Koontz. Furthermore, legislative exactions that satisfy those two 
criteria also should not be governed by the factored analysis in 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.15 Instead, a 
“reasonable relationship” test should be applied to legislative 
exactions that satisfy those two criteria. 
Part II of this Article discusses the constitutional rationales 
that guided the Court in reaching its decision in Koontz regarding 
adjudicative monetary exactions. Part III examines how those 
rationales, as well as the arguments raised by the Koontz dissent, 
demonstrate that Nollan/Dolan should not govern legislative 
exactions that are generally-applied and provide no meaningful 
discretion to administrators. Part IV explains why the Penn 
Central factored analysis also should not govern legislative 
exactions that meet those two criteria. Part V demonstrates why 
a reasonable relationship test that has been employed in various 
forms by state courts should govern legislative exactions that 
satisfy those two criteria. Applying that reasonable relationship 
test to qualifying legislative exactions lessens judicial 
interference with local land use decisions, reinforces the 
constitutional rationale in Koontz that development projects 
should pay for the external costs they create, and addresses the 
concern of property owners that some generally-applied 
legislative exactions may “go too far.” 
 
[https://perma.cc/7YDA-TC4V] (Koontz “creates potential confusion as any 
legitimate monetary payment required by a governmental entity—such as a 
payment for costs relating to sewer, water, traffic or wetlands—now also falls 
under the same balancing test.”). 
14. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. at 929 (emphasis added).   
15. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1
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II. KOONTZ EXTENDED THE HEIGHTENED 
SCRUTINY OF NOLLAN/DOLAN TO AD HOC, 
ADJUDICATIVE MONETARY EXACTIONS, BUT 
DID NOT ADDRESS WHETHER NOLLAN/DOLAN 
ALSO APPLIES TO LEGISLATIVE EXACTIONS 
A. The Heightened Scrutiny in Nollan/Dolan Is Designed 
to Protect Land-Use Applicants from a Specific Type 
of Regulatory Taking 
The Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment provides “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”16 It does not prohibit the taking of private 
property, “but instead places a condition on the exercise of that 
power.”17 The Takings Clause is designed “to secure 
compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference 
amounting to a taking.”18 
The “paradigmatic” taking that requires just compensation is 
a “direct government appropriation or physical invasion of private 
property.”19 When the government physically takes possession of 
an interest in property for some public purpose, “it has a 
categorical duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of 
whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or 
merely a part thereof.”20 That category of “physical takings” cases 
“requires courts to apply a clear rule.”21 
However, beginning with the 1922 case of Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon,22 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that 
“[g]overnment regulation of private property may, in some 
instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct 
appropriation or ouster—and that such ‘regulatory takings’ may 
 
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause is made applicable to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. 
v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). 
17. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of 
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987). 
18. Id. at 315. 
19. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005). 
20. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (internal citation omitted). 
21. Id. at 323 (quoting Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)). 
22. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
7
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be compensable under the Fifth Amendment.”23 A “regulatory 
takings” case “‘necessarily entails complex factual assessments of 
the purposes and economic effects of government actions.’”24 So 
far, the Court has recognized four (4) different theories under 
which a government regulation may be challenged under the 
Takings Clause. Two of those theories are deemed per se takings, 
and two of those theories are not. The two categories of regulatory 
action that are deemed per se takings are “where government 
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her 
property,”25 and where regulations “completely deprive an owner 
of ‘all economically beneficial us[e]’ of her property.”26 For 
regulatory actions that do not involve per se takings, the Supreme 
Court has historically applied either the factored analysis in Penn 
Central or the heightened standard of review in Nollan/Dolan. 
Under Penn Central, the Court applied a three-factor 
regulatory takings analysis that examines the economic impact of 
the regulation, the extent to which it interferes with investment-
 
23. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537–38 (“In Justice Holmes’ storied but cryptic 
formulation, ‘while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation 
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.’” (citing Pa. Coal Co. 260 U.S. at 
415)). 
24. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323 (quoting Yee, 503 U.S. at 523). In Tahoe-
Sierra, the Court explained the rationale as to why judicial review is different in 
physical takings cases and regulatory takings cases:  
This longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for 
public use, on the one hand, and regulations prohibiting private us-
es, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat cases involving 
physical takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a 
claim that there has been a “regulatory taking,” and vice versa. . . . 
Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact prop-
erty values in some tangential way—often in completely unantici-
pated ways. Treating them all as per se takings would transform 
government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford. 
By contrast, physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily iden-
tified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual property 
rights. 
Id. at 323–24.   
25. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)). 
26. Id. (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)) 
(emphasis in original). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1
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backed expectations, and the character of the governmental 
action.27 
Under the two-part inquiry of Nollan/Dolan, “a unit of 
government may not condition the approval of a land-use permit 
on the owner’s relinquishment of a portion of his property unless 
there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the 
government’s demand and the effects of the proposed land use.”28 
In Koontz, the majority of the Justices held that this two-part test 
applies when the government demands a monetary exaction in 
order to obtain an adjudicative land use permit.29 
B. The Majority in Koontz Applied Nollan/Dolan to Ad 
Hoc, Adjudicative Monetary Exactions 
The petitioner in Koontz (and his father before him) sought to 
develop a portion of his 14.9-acre property, the southern portion 
of which included wetlands.30 His development plans called for 
the development of the 3.7-acre northern section of his property.31 
Under Florida state law, a landowner wishing to undertake 
construction on that particular type of property had to obtain a 
management and storage of surface water permit (which could 
 
27. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. (Penn Central) v. City of New York, 438 
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); see also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 
U.S. 340, 349 (1986); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 
224–25 (1986); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). In 
Lingle, the Court explained the Penn Central analysis as follows: 
The Court in Penn Central acknowledged that it had hitherto been 
“unable to develop any ‘set formula’” for evaluating regulatory tak-
ings claims, but identified “several factors that have particular sig-
nificance.” Primary among those factors are “[t]he economic impact 
of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations.” In addition, the “character of the governmental ac-
tion”-for instance whether it amounts to a physical invasion or in-
stead merely affects property interests through “some public pro-
gram adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote 
the common good” may be relevant in discerning whether a taking 
has occurred. 
544 U.S. at 538–39 (internal citations omitted). 
28. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 
(2013). 
29. Id. at 2603. 
30. Id. at 2591-92. 
31. Id. at 2592.  
9
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impose “such reasonable conditions” on the permit as are 
“necessary to assure” that construction will “not be harmful to the 
water resources of the district”) and a wetlands resource 
management permit.32 Petitioner sought such a permit from the 
St. Johns River Water Management District (“District”).33 To 
mitigate the environmental effects of his proposal, petitioner 
offered to foreclose any possible future development of the 
approximately 11-acre southern section of his land by deeding to 
the District a conservation easement on that portion of his 
property.34 The District considered the proposed easement to be 
inadequate, and informed petitioner that the District would 
approve construction only if he agreed to one of two concessions: 
(a) Petitioner reduce the size of his development to 1 acre and 
deed a conservation easement to the District on the remaining 
13.9 acres; or (b) proceed with the development on the terms 
proposed by petitioner and hire contractors to make 
improvements to District-owned land several miles away.35 The 
District also said that it “would also favorably consider” 
alternatives to its suggested offsite mitigation projects if 
petitioner proposed something “equivalent.”36 
Petitioner filed suit in a Florida state court under a state law 
that provides money damages for agency action that are “an 
unreasonable exercise of the state’s police power constituting a 
taking without just compensation.”37 The Florida trial court 
found that the District’s demands failed to comply with 
Nollan/Dolan.38 The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed.39 
The Florida Supreme Court reversed on two grounds: (1) unlike 
the conditional approvals in Nollan or Dolan, the District here 
denied Petitioner’s permit application; and (2) a monetary 
exaction cannot give rise to a takings claim under 
 
32. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2592.  
33. Id.  
34. Id. at 2592-93.  
35. Id. at 2593. 
36. Id.  
37. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 373.617(2) (2016)). 
38. Id. 
39. Id.  
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1
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Nollan/Dolan.40 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and held that 
the Florida Supreme Court erred on both grounds.41 
First, the Court unanimously agreed the Nollan/Dolan 
standard may apply to the government’s denial of a permit. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito stated that “the 
government’s demand for property from a land-use permit 
applicant must satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan 
even when the government denies the permit . . . .”42 The dissent 
agreed: “The Nollan-Dolan standard applies not only when the 
government approves a development permit conditioned on the 
owner’s conveyance of a property interest (i.e., imposes a 
condition subsequent), but also when the government denies a 
permit until the owner meets the condition (i.e., imposes a 
condition precedent).”43 
Second, by a 5-4 margin, the Court held that “so-called 
‘monetary exactions’ must satisfy the nexus and rough 
proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.”44 The 
majority concluded that a government’s “demand for property” 
from a land-use permit applicant must satisfy the requirements 
of Nollan and Dolan, “even when its demand is for money.”45 
Thus, the majority in Koontz applied the heightened scrutiny of 
Nollan and Dolan to monetary exactions in an ad hoc, 
individualized context. The analysis below examines the 
constitutional rationales adopted by the majority in reaching that 
conclusion. 
C. The Majority in Koontz Focused on Extortionate 
Governmental Demands and Monetary Targeting of 
Specific Properties 
Writing for the majority, Justice Alito explained that the 
constitutional basis for the heightened scrutiny in Nollan/Dolan 
is the “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine. The Court explained 
that, because “the government may not deny a benefit to a person 
 
40. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2593-94.  
41. Id. at 2603. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
44. Id. at 2599. 
45. Id. at 2603. 
11
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because he exercises a constitutional right,”46 the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine “vindicates the 
Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the government 
from coercing people into giving them up.”47 The premise of any 
unconstitutional conditions claim “is that the government could 
not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim 
to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.”48 
Justice Alito noted that Nollan and Dolan involve “‘a special 
application’ of [the unconstitutional conditions] doctrine that 
protects the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation for 
property the government takes when owners apply for land-use 
permits.”49 
The majority opinion discussed the “two realities of the 
permitting process” that warrant the “special application” of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine under Nollan/Dolan.50 The 
first reality is “that land-use permit applicants are especially 
vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often has 
broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far more than 
property it would like to take.”51 Justice Alito explains the 
“extortionate” nature of that relationship between permit 
applicants and local governments: 
By conditioning a building permit on the owner’s deeding over a 
public right-of-way, for example, the government can pressure an 
owner into voluntarily giving up property for which the Fifth 
Amendment would otherwise require just compensation. So long 
as the building permit is more valuable than any just compensa-
tion the owner could hope to receive for the right-of-way, the 
owner is likely to accede to the government’s demand, no matter 
how unreasonable. Extortionate demands of this sort frustrate 
 
46. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594 (citing Regan v. Taxation With Representa-
tion of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983). 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 2598. 
49. Id. at 2594 (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 
(2005)). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1
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the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation, and the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine prohibits them.52 
 Justice Alito continues: 
Extortionate demands for property in the land-use permitting 
context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take 
property but because they impermissibly burden the right not to 
have property taken without just compensation. As in other un-
constitutional conditions cases in which someone refuses to cede 
a constitutional right in the face of coercive pressure, the imper-
missible denial of a governmental benefit is a constitutionally 
cognizable injury.53 
Thus, the potential for extortionate demands by the 
government warrants application of the heightened scrutiny of 
Nollan/Dolan in the land use context.54 
The second reality of the permitting process, according to the 
majority, is that “many proposed land uses threaten to impose 
costs on the public that dedications of property can offset.”55 
Justice Alito recognized that requiring landowners to internalize 
the negative externalities of their conduct “is a hallmark of 
responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such 
regulations against constitutional attack.”56 
The heightened scrutiny in Nollan/Dolan accommodates 
those two realities “by allowing the government to condition 
approval of a permit on the dedication of property to the public so 
long as there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the 
property that the government demands and the social costs of the 
 
52. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594-95 (internal citations omitted). 
53. Id. at 2596 (emphasis added). 
54. Because of that threat of extortionate demands in the adjudicative 
exactions context, the majority in Koontz explained that heightened scrutiny 
was needed, despite the potential applicability of other constitutional doctrines: 
the court has “repeatedly rejected the dissent’s contention that other 
constitutional doctrines leave no room for the nexus and rough proportionality 
requirements of Nollan and Dolan. Mindful of the special vulnerability of land 
use permit applicants to extortionate demands for money, we do so again today.” 
Id. at 2602–03. 
55. Id. at 2595. 
56. Id. 
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applicant’s proposal.”57 Thus, the Court’s precedents combine 
those two realities by allowing the government “to insist that 
applicants bear the full costs of their proposals while still 
forbidding the government from engaging in ‘out-and-out . . . 
extortion’ that would thwart the Fifth Amendment right to just 
compensation.58 Those rationales must be addressed in any 
analysis of judicial scrutiny of legislative exactions. 
Furthermore, the majority in Koontz essentially made four 
arguments in support of applying Nollan/Dolan to the ad hoc 
monetary exactions in that case. First, Justice Alito argued that 
it would be “very easy” for land-use permitting officials to evade 
the limitations of Nollan/Dolan if monetary exactions were not 
brought under that heightened scrutiny.59 For example, 
“[b]ecause the government need only provide a permit applicant 
with one alternative that satisfies the nexus and rough 
proportionality standards, a permitting authority wishing to 
exact an easement could simply give the owner a choice of either 
surrendering an easement or making a payment equal to the 
easement’s value.”60 Those “in lieu of” fees are “functionally 
equivalent to other types of land use exactions.”61 
Second, the Koontz majority distinguished the monetary 
exaction imposed on the particular real property in that case from 
general taxes that were addressed in Eastern Enterprises v. 
Apfel.62 In Eastern Enterprises, the United States retroactively 
imposed on a former mining company an obligation to pay for the 
medical benefits of retired miners and their families.63 A four-
Justice plurality in Eastern Enterprises concluded that the 
statute’s imposition of retroactive financial liability was so 
arbitrary that it violated the Takings Clause.64 However, Justice 
Kennedy joined four other Justices in dissent in Eastern 
Enterprises in arguing that the Takings Clause does not apply to 
 
57. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 
391 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)). 
58. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 
837). 
59. Id. at 2599.  
60. Id. 
61. Id.  
62. Id. (citing E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998)). 
63. E. Enters, 524 U.S. at 513-14, 517. 
64. Id. at 538. 
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government-imposed financial obligations that “d[o] not operate 
upon or alter an identified property interest.”65 The majority in 
Koontz distinguishes Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Eastern 
Enterprises by focusing on the property-specific nature of the 
exaction at issue in Koontz. Justice Alito wrote that, unlike 
Eastern Enterprises, the demand for money in Koontz “‘operate[d] 
upon . . . an identified property interest’ by directing the owner of 
a particular piece of property to make a monetary payment,” and 
“burdened petitioner’s ownership of a specific parcel of land.”66 
The Koontz case therefore bore a resemblance to cases holding 
that the government must pay just compensation “when it takes a 
lien–a right to receive money that is secured by a particular piece 
of property.”67 Justice Alito explained: 
The fulcrum this case turns on is the direct link between the gov-
ernment’s demand and a specific parcel of real property. Because 
of that direct link, this case implicates the central concern of Nol-
lan and Dolan: the risk that the government may use its substan-
tial power and discretion in land-use permitting to pursue gov-
ernmental ends that lack an essential nexus and rough 
proportionality to the effects of the proposed new use of the spe-
cific property at issue, thereby diminishing without justification 
the value of the property.68 
Justice Alito added: 
[The petitioner] does not ask us to hold that the government can 
commit a regulatory taking by directing someone to spend money. 
As a result, we need not apply Penn Central’s “essentially ad hoc, 
factual inquir[y],” at all, much less extend that “already difficult 
and uncertain rule” to the “vast category of cases” in which some-
one believes that a regulation is too costly. Eastern Enterprises, 
524 U. S. at 542, (opinion of Kennedy, J.). Instead, petitioner’s 
claim rests on the more limited proposition that when the gov-
ernment commands the relinquishment of funds linked to a spe-
cific, identifiable property interest such as a bank account or par-
 
65. E. Enters, 524 U.S. at 540 (Kennedy, J., opinion concurring in judgment 
and dissenting in part). 
66. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 2600 (emphasis added). 
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cel of real property, a “per se [takings] approach” is the proper 
mode of analysis under the Court’s precedent.69 
Thus, the majority in Koontz emphasized the individualized, 
property-specific nature of the exaction that falls within 
Nollan/Dolan. 
Third, Justice Alito rejected the argument that, if monetary 
exactions are made subject to scrutiny under Nollan and Dolan, 
then there will be no principled way of distinguishing 
impermissible land-use exactions from property taxes. He wrote 
that “[i]t is beyond dispute that ‘[t]axes and user fees . . . are not 
“takings,”‘“ and therefore the Court’s holding in Koontz “does not 
affect the ability of governments to impose property taxes, user 
fees, and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial 
burdens on property owners.”70 Also, he explained, the Court has 
had “little trouble distinguishing” between the power of taxation 
and the power of eminent domain.71 
D. The Dissent in Koontz Decried Judicial Intrusion into 
Local Land Use Decisions 
Writing for the dissent, Justice Kagan refused to apply 
Nollan/Dolan to monetary exactions in the land use context. She 
explained that “[c]laims that government regulations violate the 
Takings Clause by unduly restricting the use of property are 
generally ‘governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, (1978).’”72 While the 
Penn Central test “balances the government’s manifest need to 
pass laws and regulations ‘adversely affect[ing] . . . economic 
values,’ with our longstanding recognition that some regulation 
‘goes too far,’” the Nollan and Dolan decisions are different 
because “[t]hey provide an independent layer of protection in ‘the 
special context of land-use exactions.’”73 She added: “Nollan and 
Dolan thus serve not to address excessive regulatory burdens on 
 
69. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 (alteration in original) (emphasis added at 
“specific, identifiable property interest”) (citations omitted). 
70. Id. at 2600-01 (citing Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 
U.S. 216, 243 n.2 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
71. Id. at 2602. 
72. Id. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
73. Id. (citations omitted). 
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land use (the function of Penn Central), but instead to stop the 
government from imposing an ‘unconstitutional condition’—a 
requirement that a person give up his constitutional right to 
receive just compensation ‘in exchange for a discretionary benefit’ 
8having ‘little or no relationship’ to the property taken.”74 The 
dissent concluded that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
cannot apply to challenges to monetary exactions at all in the 
land use context.75 Justice Kagan explained: “[A] court can use 
the Penn Central framework, the Due Process Clause, and (in 
many places) state law to protect against monetary demands, 
whether or not imposed to evade Nollan and Dolan, that simply 
“go[] too far.”76 
The dissent also highlighted the ambiguity regarding the 
scope of the majority’s opinion. Specifically, Justice Kagan was 
concerned that, by extending Nollan and Dolan’s heightened 
scrutiny to a simple payment demand, “the majority threatens 
the heartland of local land-use regulation and service delivery, at 
a bare minimum depriving state and local governments of 
‘necessary predictability.’”77 She lamented that, “[b]y applying 
Nollan and Dolan to permit conditions requiring monetary 
payments–with no express limitation except as to taxes–the 
majority extends the Takings Clause, with its notoriously 
‘difficult’ and ‘perplexing’ standards, into the very heart of local 
land-use regulation and service delivery.”78 Justice Kagan was 
concerned that “the flexibility of state and local governments to 
take the most routine actions to enhance their communities will 
diminish accordingly.”79 The dissent questioned the majority’s 
position that the decision will have only limited impact on 
localities’ land-use authority, because “the majority’s refusal ‘to 
say more’ about the scope of its new rule now casts a cloud on 
 
74. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
75. Id. at 2606-07, -09 n.3 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
76. Id. at 2609 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) 
77. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 
542 (1998) (Kennedy, J., opinion concurring in judgment and dissenting in 
part)).   
78. Id. at 2607 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).   
79. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
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every decision by every local government to require a person 
seeking a permit to pay or spend money.”80 
E. Koontz Left Open the Question of Whether 
Nollan/Dolan Applies to Legislative Exactions 
The majority in Koontz did not address the issue of whether 
legislatively applied exactions are also governed by 
Nollan/Dolan. Professor John Echeverria notes: “The majority 
opinion in Koontz is pointedly silent as to whether the ruling 
applies only to ad hoc fees or applies to fees imposed through 
general rules as well.”81 Professor Echeverria aptly predicts: 
“With respect to monetary fees, one issue that will preoccupy the 
lower courts in the years ahead is whether the Koontz ruling that 
monetary fees are subject to Nollan/Dolan applies to fees 
calculated and imposed, not in ad hoc proceedings, but through 
general legislation.”82 As discussed above, that ambiguity has led 
Justice Thomas to recently point out the “compelling reasons for 
resolving this conflict at the earliest practicable opportunity.”83 
For the reasons discussed below, this author recommends 
that the Court should follow Justice Kagan’s suggestion in Koontz 
that the Court “approve the rule, adopted in several States, that 
Nollan and Dolan apply only to permitting fees that are imposed 
ad hoc, and not to fees that are generally applicable.”84 
 
80. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
81. John D. Echeverria, Koontz: The Very Worst Takings Decision Ever?, 22 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 54-55 (2014). 
82. Id. at 54.  
83. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 929 (2016). 
84. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing as an example 
Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996)).  
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1
 2017] LET’S BE REASONABLE 255 
III. NOLLAN/DOLAN GENERALLY SHOULD NOT 
APPLY TO LEGISLATIVE EXACTIONS IN LIGHT 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RATIONALES 
DISCUSSED IN KOONTZ 
A. The Language in Dolan, Itself, Draws a Distinction 
Between Adjudicative and Legislative Exactions 
The Court has never directly addressed the issue of whether 
Nollan/Dolan test applies to legislative exactions. Citing his 
dissent to a denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 1995 
case of Parking Association of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,85 
Justice Thomas came the closest to addressing that issue when he 
recently opined that he “continue[s] to doubt that ‘the existence of 
a taking should turn on the type of governmental entity 
responsible for the taking.’”86 In Parking Association, Justice 
Thomas earlier explained: 
It is hardly surprising that some courts have applied [Dolan’s] 
rough proportionality test even when considering a legislative 
enactment. It is not clear why the existence of a taking should 
turn on the type of governmental entity responsible for the tak-
ing. A city council can take property just as well as a planning 
commission can. Moreover, the general applicability of the ordi-
nance should not be relevant in a takings analysis. . . . The dis-
tinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized 
administrative takings appears to be a distinction without a con-
stitutional difference.87 
Since Justice Thomas articulated those comments in Parking 
Association, however, courts have recognized several 
 
85. Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta , 515 U.S. 1116, 1118 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
86. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n,136 S. Ct. at 928 (quoting Parking Ass’n of Ga., 
515 U.S. at 1116). 
87. Parking Ass’n of Ga., 515 U.S. at 1117-18; see Luke A. Wake & Jarod 
M. Bona, Legislative Exactions After Koontz v. St. John River Management 
District, 27 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 539, 571 (2015) (“If the sine qua non of an 
unconstitutional conditions violation is [the] government’s imposed choice between 
giving up a constitutional right to attain something wanted and foregoing the 
wanted item, it does not matter whether the choice arrives by legislative 
enactment or through the discretion of permitting authorities.”).   
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constitutional grounds to distinguish between legislative and 
adjudicative exactions in the application of Nollan/Dolan. 
In her dissent in Koontz, Justice Kagan found such a 
distinction within the language in Dolan. She explained that 
“Dolan itself suggested that limitation by underscoring that there 
‘the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s 
application for a building permit on an individual parcel,’ instead 
of imposing an ‘essentially legislative determination[ ] classifying 
entire areas of the city.’”88 Other courts have found that 
comparative language in Dolan to be constitutionally significant. 
For example, in Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation District, the 
Colorado Supreme Court noted that the language in Dolan 
“distinguished typical land use regulations from the type of 
pointed exaction demanded in Dolan,”89 and reinforced the fact 
that Nollan and Dolan “concerned discretionary adjudicative 
determinations specific to one landowner and one parcel of land, 
and involved a demand for the dedication of a portion of the land 
for public use.”90 The Arizona Supreme Court similarly 
recognized in Home Builders Association of Central Arizona v. 
City of Scottsdale91 that “the Chief Justice [in Dolan] was careful 
to point out that the case involved a city’s adjudicative decision to 
impose a condition tailored to the particular circumstances of an 
individual case,” whereas the development fee at issue in the 
Arizona case “involves a generally applicable legislative decision 
by the city.”92 
 
88. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994)). 
89. 19 P.3d 687, 696 (2001).   
90. Id. at 695. In Lingle, the U.S. Supreme Court similarly stated: “Both 
Nollan and Dolan involved Fifth Amendment takings challenges to adjudicative 
land-use exactions”; and “[t]he Court further refined this requirement in Dolan, 
holding that an adjudicative exaction requiring dedication of private property 
must also be ‘“roughly proportional” . . . both in nature and extent to the impact 
of the proposed development.’” 544 U.S. 528, 546-47 (2005) (emphasis added). 
91. 930 P.2d 993 (Ariz. 1997). 
92. Id. at 1000 (emphasis in original); see also Se. Cass Water Res. Dist. v. 
Burlington N. R.R. Co., 527 N.W.2d 884, 896 (N.W. 1995) (whereas Dolan made 
a distinction between the city’s “adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s 
application for a building permit on an individual parcel,” and other decisions 
that involved “essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of 
the city,” a North Dakota state statute that required railroads to modify bridges 
and culverts at their own expense did not constitute a compensable taking 
because the railroad’s duty arose “not from a municipal ‘adjudicative decision to 
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Like the dissent in Koontz and such other lower courts, the 
U.S. Supreme Court will likely recognize that the language of 
Dolan, itself, draws a constitutionally significant difference 
between legislative and adjudicative exactions. 
B. The “Extortionate Demands” Prong of the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Demonstrates 
that Nollan/Dolan Should Not Apply to Legislative 
Exactions that Contain No Meaningful Administrative 
Discretion 
As it did in Koontz, the Court will likely begin its analysis of 
the applicability of Nollan/Dolan to legislative exactions by 
considering the “two realities of the permitting process” that 
underlie the application of the unconstitutional conditions. The 
first “reality” of the permitting process is the potential for an 
“extortionate” relationship between land use applicants and 
permitting agencies, and the “special vulnerability of land use 
permit applicants to extortionate demands for money.”93 
However, that concern is greatly diminished in the context of 
legislative exactions because such exactions are less prone to 
 
condition,’ but rather from an express and general legislated duty under a 
constitutional reservation of police power over a corporation”); Spinell Homes, 
Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 78 P.3d 692, 702 (Alaska 2003) (“A 
Nollan/Dolan taking may arise when the government makes ‘an adjudicative 
decision to condition [the landowner’s] application for a building permit on an 
individual parcel,’ as opposed to a legislative determination of general 
application. . . . But [plaintiff] Spinell has not demonstrated that the 
municipality specially required Spinell to dedicate any property for public 
easements or to construct new street. The municipality simply required that 
predetermined municipal requirements be satisfied before it would issue 
permits or certificates. These requirements were city-wide conditions . . . There 
is no indication Spinell was required to do anything other developers were not 
required to do to satisfy the plat notes for their subdivisions” (quoting Dolan, 
512 U.S. at 385)); Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship v. Montgomery Cty., 650 A.2d 
712, 724 (1994) (The U.S. Supreme Court in Dolan, “in reaching its holding, 
specifically relied on two distinguishing characteristics that are absent in the 
instant case. First, the Court mentioned that instead of making ‘legislative 
determinations classifying entire areas of the city,’ the City of Tigard ‘made an 
adjudicative decision to condition [the landowner’s] application for a building 
permit on an individual parcel.’  . . . In contrast, Montgomery County imposed 
the development impact tax by legislative enactment, not by adjudication . . ..” 
(Citation omitted.)) 
93. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2603 
(2013). 
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“leveraging” (i.e., extortionate demands). That is the conclusion of 
a number of lower courts that have considered that issue. 
The California Supreme Court in Erlich v. Culver City94 
applied the Nollan/Dolan test to ad-hoc, adjudicative exactions, 
but not to exactions that are imposed legislatively.95 In Ehrlich, a 
developer requested that a city amend its general plan, change 
the zoning of his property and amend the specific plan in order to 
allow him to build a 39-unit residential condominium complex on 
his property, which property had previously been used as a 
private tennis club and recreational facility.96 Eventually, the city 
council approved the application “conditioned upon the payment 
of certain monetary conditions”97 which included fees to be used 
for partial replacement of the lost recreational facilities 
occasioned by the specific plan amendment; and a fee under the 
city’s “art in public places” program.98 The developer filed a 
petition for writ of mandate to set aside both fees as 
unconstitutional takings.99 
The California Supreme Court decided the case not only by 
reference to the constitutional takings clause, but also under 
California’s Mitigation Fee Act (“Act”).100 Section 66001 of the Act 
sets forth a two-part standard for assessing the reasonableness of 
a monetary exaction by local governments. Subdivision (b) of 
section 66001applies to “adjudicatory, case-by-case actions” 
involving application of a fee ordinance to a particular 
development project.101 For such adjudicatory ad hoc fees, 
subdivision (b), provides: 
In any action imposing a fee as a condition of approval of a devel-
opment project by a local agency, the local agency shall deter-
 
94. The California Supreme Court’s decision in Ehrlich followed a remand 
from the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider that case in light of Dolan. Ehrlich v. 
City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994). 
95. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996) (Arabian, J., 
plurality opinion).   
96. Id. at 434 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 435 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 433 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion).  
101. Garrick Dev. Co. v. Hayward Unified Sch. Dist., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 897, 
907 (1992). 
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mine how there is a reasonable relationship between the amount 
of the fee and the cost of the public facility or portion of the public 
facility attributable to the development on which the fee is im-
posed.102 
The Ehrlich court construed the “reasonable relationship” 
language in subdivision (b) that applies to ad hoc determinations 
“as imposing a requirement consistent with the Nollan/Dolan 
standard, we serve the legislative purpose of protecting 
developers from disproportionate and excessive fees.”103 The 
Ehrlich court therefore viewed the ad hoc land use permit context 
in the same way as the majority of the Justices on the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently did in Koontz. However, the Ehrlich 
court took a very different approach to legislatively-imposed 
monetary exactions. Subdivision (a) of section 66001 applies to 
the adoption of legislative exactions,104 and requires that a local 
agency to determine “how there is a reasonable relationship” 
 
102. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 66001(b) (West 2007) (emphasis added). 
103. Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 438 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion). The Ehrlich 
court explained the regulatory “leveraging” of permit power in the context of 
adjudicatory land use permits:  
In our view, the intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny formulat-
ed by the high court in Nollan and Dolan is intended to address just 
such indicators in land use ‘bargains’ between property owners and 
regulatory bodies—those in which the local government conditions 
permit approval for a given use on the owner’s surrender of benefits 
which purportedly offset the impact of the proposed development. It 
is in this paradigmatic permit context—where the individual proper-
ty owner-developer seeks to negotiate approval of a planned devel-
opment—that the combined Nollan and Dolan test quintessentially 
applies. 
Id. The court added:  
It is the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases, au-
thorized by a permit scheme which by its nature allows for both the 
discretionary deployment of the police power and an enhanced po-
tential for its abuse, that constitutes the sine qua non for application 
of the intermediate standard of scrutiny formulated by the court in 
Nollan and Dolan. 
 Id. at 439 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion). In his concurring opinion in Ehrlich, 
Justice Mosk similarly explained: “[W]hen a municipality singles out a property 
developer for a development fee not imposed on others, a somewhat heightened 
scrutiny of that fee is required to ensure that the developer is not being subject 
to arbitrary treatment for extortionate motives.” Id. at 460 (Mosk, J., concurring 
opinion). 
104. Garrick, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907. 
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between the proposed use of a given exaction and both “the type 
of development project” and “the need for the public facility and 
the type of development project on which the fee is imposed.”105 
In a concurring opinion in Ehrlich, Justice Mosk explained that 
“general governmental fees” are “judged under a standard of 
scrutiny closer to the rational basis review of the equal protection 
clause than the heightened scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan.”106 He 
added, “Courts will, for federal constitutional purposes, defer to 
the legislative capacity of the states and their subdivisions to 
calculate and charge fees designated for legitimate government 
objectives, unless the fees are plainly arbitrary or 
confiscatory.”107 
Other state supreme courts have adopted Ehrlich’s approach 
to legislative exactions. For example, the Supreme Court for the 
State of Washington repeated the observation in Ehrlich that “it 
is not at all clear that the rationale (and the heightened standard 
of scrutiny) of Nollan and Dolan applies to cases in which the 
exaction takes the form of a generally applicable development fee 
or assessment – cases in which the courts have deferred to 
legislative and political processes to formulate ‘public program[s] 
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the 
common good.’”108 The Colorado Supreme Court similarly 
explained: 
One critical difference between a legislatively based fee and a 
specific, discretionary adjudicative determination is that the risk 
of leveraging or extortion on the part of the government is virtu-
ally nonexistent in a fee system. When a governmental entity as-
sesses a generally applicable, legislatively based development fee, 
all similarly situated landowners are subject to the same fee 
schedule, and a specific landowner cannot be singled out for ex-
traordinary concessions as a condition of development.109 
 
105. Erlich, 911 P.2d at 436-37 (Arabian, J., plurality opinion) (quoting 
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 66001(a)(3)-(4)).   
106. Id. at 457 (Mosk, J., concurring). 
107. Id. at 458. 
108. City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808 n.4 (Wash. 2006) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 447).  
109. Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 696 (Colo. 2001). 
24https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1
 2017] LET’S BE REASONABLE 261 
Likewise, the Arizona Supreme Court observed that “the 
Dolan analysis applied to cases of regulatory leveraging that 
occur when the landowner must bargain for approval of a 
particular use of its land,” but the risk of that sort of leveraging 
“does not exist when the exaction is embodied in a generally 
applicable legislative decision.”110 
The California Supreme Court revisited the distinction 
drawn in Ehrlich between generally applicable development fees 
and “special, discretionary permit conditions” in San Remo Hotel 
v. City and County of San Francisco.111 In that case, plaintiff 
owners of a hotel sought approval from the City and County of 
San Francisco to rent all rooms in the hotel to tourists or other 
daily renters, rather than to longer term residents. The city 
granted that approval subject to plaintiffs’ compliance with the 
City’s Residential Hotel Unit Conversion and Demolition 
Ordinance (“HCO”), which required replacement of the 
residential units the City claimed would be lost by the conversion, 
or paying an in-lieu fee into a governmental fund for the 
construction of low and moderate-income housing.112 In response 
to plaintiffs’ takings challenge to the conversion fee, the 
California Supreme Court refused to apply Nollan/Dolan and 
instead applied the deferential test for legislatively imposed fees 
under the Mitigation Fee Act that was discussed in Ehrlich.113 
The court explained: 
While legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of im-
proper leveraging, such generally applicable legislation is subject 
to the ordinary restraints of the democratic political process. A 
city council that charged extortionate fees for all property devel-
opment, unjustifiable by mitigation needs, would likely face 
widespread and well-financed opposition at the next election. Ad 
hoc individual monetary exactions deserve special judicial scruti-
ny mainly because, affecting fewer citizens and evading system-
 
110. Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 
1000 (Ariz. 1997). 
111. San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 103 (Cal. 2002); 
see also Ocean Harbor House Homeowners Ass’n. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 77 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (Nollan/Dolan test applies to “ad hoc 
mitigation fees”). 
112. San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 91. 
113. Id. at 105. 
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atic assessment, they are more likely to escape such political con-
trols.114 
Similar to that rationale in San Remo Hotel, some 
commentators suggest that a key constitutional concern in the ad 
hoc context is the lack of transparency in the imposition of 
permitting exactions, which is generally not a concern in the 
legislative context.115 
Other state supreme courts have adopted the “political 
process” rationale behind the legislative/adjudicative distinction 
described in Ehrlich and San Remo Hotel. For example, the 
Oregon Supreme Court held in Rogers Machinery, Inc. v. 
Washington County116 that a traffic impact fee assessed against 
property developers under a county ordinance to fund 
improvements to city streets was not governed by the 
Nollan/Dolan test.117 In support of that conclusion, the Oregon 
court stated that, “as Ehrlich and San Remo Hotel accurately 
observe, the two-pronged heightened scrutiny that the Court 
adopted in Dolan was animated by the Court’s particular concern 
with the sort of governmental leveraging that can arise in case-
by-case adjudicatory imposition of development conditions.”118 
The Oregon court adopted the reasoning of San Remo Hotel that 
 
114. Id.; see McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1282 (2009) (“As noted by San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d 
at 105, any concerns of improper legislative development fees are better kept in 
check by ‘ordinary restraints of the democratic political process.’”). 
115. See Echeverria, supra note 81, at 54 (“[L]egislative enactments are 
generally the product of more carefully considered, transparent decision making 
by senior government officers than permitting decisions arrived at in ad hoc 
administrative proceedings. Nollan and Dolan are arguably rooted in the 
Court’s particular suspicions about the negotiations that occur in the court of ad 
hoc proceedings. Thus a majority of the Court may be willing not to extend 
Nollan and Dolan to legislative fees.”); see also Steven J. Eagle, Koontz in the 
Mansion and the Gatehouse, 46 URB. LAW 1, 24 (2014) (citing Town of Leesburgh 
v. Giordano, 701 S.E.2d 783 (2010)) (“Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Koontz 
does not reflect disdain for development exactions, but may express irritation 
with the lack of transparency in the process by which developers are led to 
accede to informal demands for possibly unreasonable exactions. In the case of 
incentive fees or applicant-created infrastructure expenses of a routine nature, 
transparency could be furthered by legislatively-enacted fee schedules. Those 
are upheld unless clearly unreasonable.”). 
116. 45 P.3d 966 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 
117. Id. at 981-82.  
118. Id. at 982. 
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“‘[w]hile legislatively mandated fees do present some danger of 
improper leveraging, such generally applicable legislation is 
subject to the ordinary restraints of the democratic political 
process.’”119 
A few courts, such as the Texas Supreme Court, appear to be 
more concerned about the danger of improper leveraging in the 
legislative context, even with the inherent transparency of the 
political process.120 However, that theoretical danger is present 
with any generally-applicable tax or user fee, including property 
taxes, which Koontz explicitly held is not governed by 
Nollan/Dolan.121 Moreover, the concern over improper leveraging 
in the legislative context is significantly reduced where, as in San 
Remo Hotel (1) the legislation that includes the exaction is 
“generally applicable legislation in that it applies, without 
discretion or discrimination, to every residential hotel in the city”; 
and (2) “no meaningful government discretion enters into either 
the imposition or the calculation of the in lieu fee.”122 Also, 
“extortionate demands” in the legislative context would likely be 
eliminated by the application of a “reasonable relationship” test 
 
119. Id. at 982 (quoting San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 105-06).   
120. See Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 
620, 641 (Tex. 2004) (“While we recognize that an ad hoc decision is more likely 
to constitute a taking than general legislation, we think it entirely possible that 
the government could ‘gang up’ on particular groups to force extractions that a 
majority of constituents would not only tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens 
they would otherwise bear were shifted to others.”); see also Wake & Bona, 
supra note 74, at 571 n.206. (“One conceived basis for this distinction [between 
legislative and adjudicative exactions] is that legislative bodies are—
hypothetically—less likely to treat the permitting process as an opportunity to 
force valuable concessions from landowners. The assumption is that legislative 
bodies are more accountable to the people; however, this discounts the fact that 
legislative bodies are often spurred by the utilitarian impulse, which would 
sacrifice the interest of a few individuals for the benefit of the community on the 
whole. In any event, this rationale offers no doctrinal basis for concluding that 
the same extortionate condition should be reviewed under a different standard 
when a legislative body imposes the very same constitutional injury.”).  
121. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600-01 
(2013).  
122. San Remo Hotel, 41 P.3d at 104 (the court noted that the housing 
replacement fee assessed under the HCO stood in sharp contrast to the 
recreational facilities replacement fee in Ehrlich. In the latter, the city “relied on 
no specific legislative mandate to impose the fee condition and no legislatively 
set formula to calculate its size. The condition was imposed ad hoc, entirely at 
the discretion of the city council and staff”).  
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to legislative exactions, such as the California Supreme Court did 
in San Remo Hotel with the following explanation: 
Nor are plaintiffs correct that, without Nollan/Dolan/Ehrlich 
scrutiny, legislatively imposed development mitigation fees are 
subject to no meaningful means-ends review. As a matter of both 
statutory and constitutional law, such fees must bear a reasona-
ble relationship, in both intended use and amount, to the delete-
rious public impact of the development . . . While the relationship 
between means and ends need not be so close or so thoroughly es-
tablished for legislatively imposed fees as for ad hoc fees subject 
to Ehrlich [i.e., Nollan/Dolan], the arbitrary and extortionate 
use of purported mitigation fees, even where legislatively man-
dated, will not pass constitutional muster.”123 
Thus, the concern over potential “leveraging” in the 
legislative context is not a sufficient ground to apply 
Nollan/Dolan to legislative exactions where such exactions are 
generally applicable and are not applied with any administrative 
discretion in either the imposition or the calculation of the 
exaction. 
C. Uniformly-Applied Legislative Exactions Are More 
Like the “Financial Burdens on Property Owners” that 
the Majority in Koontz Distinguished from Monetary 
Exactions Relating to a “Specific Parcel of Real 
Property” 
The majority in Koontz distinguished between two different 
types of financial burdens that government can impose on 
property owners. One type, which is governed by Nollan/Dolan, 
“‘operate[s] upon or alters an identified property interest’ by 
directing the owner of a particular piece of property to make a 
monetary payment.”124 This type of payment demand “burden[s] 
the ownership of a specific parcel of land.”125 A “per se takings” 
approach is proper when “the government commands the 
relinquishment of funds linked to a specific, identifiable property 
 
123. Id. at 105-106 (citations omitted). 
124. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599 (quoting E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 
542 (1998) (Kennedy, J.)) (emphasis added). 
125. Id. at 2590 (emphasis added). 
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interest.”126 Indeed, the “fulcrum” of the Koontz decision was “the 
direct link between the government’s demand and a specific 
parcel of real property.”127 The other type of financial burden 
imposed by government on property owners, which is not 
governed by Nollan/Dolan, involves “property taxes, user fees, 
and similar laws and regulations that may impose financial 
burdens on property owners.”128 Justice Alito juxtaposed these 
two types of financial when he noted that “the power of taxation 
should not be confused with the power of eminent domain,”129 
and when he commented that the Court has “little trouble” 
distinguishing between such powers of “eminent domain” and 
“taxation.”130 That comparison highlights the Court’s clear 
distinction between financial obligations that explicitly target a 
specific property (i.e., eminent domain), from financial obligations 
that address parcels of land generally (i.e., taxation). 
Legislative exactions that do not target an “identified,” 
“particular,” or “specific parcel of real property,” but apply 
generally to parcels of land, are akin to “property taxes, user fees, 
and similar laws and regulations.” Since Nollan/Dolan does not 
apply to such generally-applied fees and taxes, legislative 
exactions that apply generally, and do not target “particular,” or 
“specific parcel of real property,” should not be governed by the 
Nollan/Dolan standard of review. Numerous lower courts have 
adopted that conclusion. For example, the concurring Justice in 
Ehrlich stated: 
[I]f a municipality can constitutionally impose a development tax 
as long as it is rationally based, why is a higher level of constitu-
tional scrutiny required when, as in the case of generally appli-
cable development fees, the “tax” is earmarked for use in alleviat-
ing specific development impacts rather than for the general 
fund?131 
 
126. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600 (emphasis added). 
127. Id. at 2590 (emphasis added). 
128. Id. at 2601. 
129. Id. at 2602 (quoting Houck v. Litter River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 
254, 264 (1915)). 
130. Id. at 2602.  
131. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 455 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J., 
concurring).  
29
 266 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with that concurrence: 
There is no principled basis on which to distinguish generally ap-
plicable development fees that fund the infrastructure expansion 
needed to support new development from other legislatively im-
posed and generally applicable taxes, assessments, and user fees.  
We therefore join the several courts in other jurisdictions that 
have held that Dolan does not apply to such legislatively imposed 
and calculated development fees.132 
Thus, the rationales that led the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Koontz to apply Nollan/Dolan to ad hoc monetary exactions and 
to distinguish such exactions from general taxes, are the same 
rationales that have led lower courts to make a distinction 
between adjudicative exactions and legislative exactions in the 
application of Nollan/Dolan. 
D. The Individualized Determination Required Under 
Dolan Does Not Fit the Context of Generally-Applied 
Legislative Exactions 
The “individualized determination” component of the roughly 
proportional test in Dolan is inconsistent with legislatively 
imposed development fees. Under Dolan, “the city must make 
some sort of individualized determination that the required 
dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of 
the proposed development.”133 Requiring such an “individualized 
determination” for every proposed development that could 
conceivably be impacted by a generally applied fee would be 
impractical in a judicial review of such a fee.134 
The case of Home Builders Assn. of Dayton and Miami Valley 
v. City of Beavercreek (“Dayton”)135 illustrates the doctrinal 
 
132. Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966, 982 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2002) (citing Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 455 (Mosk, J., concurring)). 
133. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (emphasis added).   
134. See e.g., City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 803 (Wash. 2006) 
(refusing to apply Nollan/Dolan and holding that a state impact fee statute did 
not require local governments to calculate a transportation impact fee by 
making individualized assessments of a new commercial development’s direct 
impact on each improvement planned in a service area). 
135. See generally, Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. 
Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000). 
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inconsistency between legislative exactions and the 
individualized assessment that is required under Dolan. In 
Dayton, the Ohio Supreme Court purported to extend “dual 
rational nexus test . . . based on the Nollan and Dolan cases” to a 
generally applicable and legislatively imposed “system of impact 
fees payable by developers of real estate to aid in the cost of new 
roadway projects.”136 The court opined that the Dolan test was 
applicable because “the appropriate test is one that balances the 
interests of the city and developers of real estate without unduly 
restricting local government.”137 The court explained that, under 
this “dual rational nexus” test, the city must first demonstrate 
that there is a “reasonable relationship between the city’s interest 
in constructing new roadways and the increase in traffic 
generated by new developments,” and if such a reasonable 
relationship exists, “it must then be demonstrated that there is a 
reasonable relationship between the impact fee imposed on a 
developer and the benefits accruing to the developer from the 
construction of new roadways.”138 However, in that purported 
effort to apply Nollan/Dolan to the legislative exaction, the Ohio 
court omitted the individualized determination that Dolan 
requires. The Oregon Supreme Court later observed that the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s actual application of the Nollan/Dolan test in 
Dayton is “questionable”139 because the Ohio court “did not seem 
to adhere to that test in its analysis.”140 That is because the 
analysis in Dayton, according to the Oregon court, “is difficult to 
square with Dolan and, in fact, mirrors the more deferential test 
traditionally used for user fees and other purely monetary 
assessments.”141 Specifically, the Oregon court noted that the 
Dayton decision “made no individualized assessment of 
proportionality at all but instead reviewed the legislation from a 
facial perspective as it applied to developers generally.”142 Thus, 
even courts that purport to apply Nollan/Dolan to legislative 
 
136. Id. at 353, 356. 
137. Id. at 355. 
138. Id. at 350. 
139. Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Washington County, 45 P.3d 966, 978 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2002).  
140. Id. at 978 n.13. 
141. Id. 
142. Id.  
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exactions (like the Ohio court in Dayton) have struggled to comply 
with the individualized assessment analysis in Dolan in the 
context of legislative exactions. 
E. Avoiding Undue Judicial Interference with Local Land 
Use Authority Is Stronger in the Legislative Context 
than it Is in the Administrative Context 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the need to avoid 
judicial interference in local legislative governance. “The reasons 
for deference to legislative judgments about the need for, and 
likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well 
established.”143 In Lingle, the Court rejected the “substantially 
advances” formula in Agins v. City of Tiburon144 for regulatory 
takings under the Fifth Amendment because that formula “would 
require courts to scrutinize the efficacy of a vast array of state 
and federal regulations - a task for which courts are not well 
suited,” and “would empower - and might often require - courts to 
substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected 
legislatures and expert agencies.”145 The Court added that “[t]he 
reasons for deference to legislative judgments about the need for, 
and likely effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well 
established.”146 That deference to legislative decision making is 
another constitutional reason to avoid the application of 
Nollan/Dolan to generally applied legislative exactions. Indeed, 
the California Supreme Court considered that the deference the 
U.S. Supreme Court grants to legislative bodies and concluded: 
“Extending Nollan and Dolan generally to all government fees 
affecting property value or development would open to searching 
judicial scrutiny the wisdom of myriad government economic 
 
143. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005). Earlier as 
a Judge of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Justice Alito similarly 
stated that a higher judicial standard of review in the context of a substantive 
due process challenge “prevents us from being cast in the role of a ‘zoning board 
of appeals.’” United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, PA, 316 
F.3d 392, 402 (3d Cir. 2002). 
144. 447 U.S. 255, 255 (1980). 
145. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544. 
146. Id. at 545. 
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regulations, a task the courts have been loath to undertake 
pursuant to either the takings or due process clause.”147 
F. After Koontz, One U.S. District Court Applied 
Nollan/Dolan to a Legislative Exaction, but for the 
Wrong Reasons 
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California applied Nollan/Dolan to a legislative exaction in the 
post-Koontz case of Levin v. City & County of San Francisco.148 
While the ultimate application of Nollan/Dolan to the exaction 
was correct, the rationales adopted by the District Court in 
reaching that decision were not; and the court’s opinion suggests 
an application of Nollan/Dolan to legislative exactions that is 
overbroad. 
In Levin, the District Court reviewed an ordinance that was 
enacted in 2014 by the City and County of San Francisco that 
required property owners wishing to withdraw their rent-
controlled property from the rental market under California’s 
Ellis Act to pay a lump sum to displaced tenants.149 That 2014 
 
147. San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 106 (Cal. 2002) 
(citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994); Penn Central v. City of 
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. 428 
U.S. 1, 19 (1976)). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit similarly declined 
to apply Nollan and Dolan to a city’s general storm pipe requirement, and made 
a distinction between an “adjudicative determination” that is applicable solely to 
individual developers and “general requirement[s] imposed through legislation,” 
in part, because “[t]o extend the Nollan/Dolan analysis here would subject any 
regulation governing development to higher scrutiny and raise the concern of 
judicial interference with the exercise of local government police powers.” 
McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
556 U.S. 1282 (2009). 
148. See generally Levin v. City of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014). The District Court’s decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, as case no. 14-17283. That appeal is pending. On appeal, 
the City and County of San Francisco explicitly raises the issue of whether 
“legislatively imposed conditions are not subject to Nollan/Dolan means-end 
scrutiny.” Opening Brief of Appellant City and County of San Francisco at 24-
28, Levin v. City of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 14-
17283). The City argues: “[G]enerally applicable conditions are not subject to 
Nollan/Dolan exactions analysis, but instead to the less stringent Penn Central 
inquiry . . ..” Id. at 26.   
149. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 7060-7060.7 (West 2016). Under California’s Ellis 
Act of 1985, government entities are restricted from “compel[ling] the owner of 
any residential real property to offer, or to continue to offer, accommodations in 
33
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Ordinance required property owners to pay the greater of a 
relocation payment due under a 2005 ordinance or twenty-four 
times the difference between the units’ current monthly rate and 
an amount that purports to be the fair market value of a 
comparable unit in San Francisco.150Although the 2014 
Ordinance was generally applied, a landlord could petition the 
City for a payment reduction on the grounds that the payment 
would constitute an “undue financial hardship.”151Under the 
specific facts in the Levin case, the plaintiff landlords were 
required to pay their tenant $117,958.89 on the day the tenant 
vacates the unit, under the payment formula in the 2014 
Ordinance.152 Plaintiffs filed a constitutional takings claim in the 
Northern District of California. 
The District Court applied Nollan/Dolan to the takings 
claim and found that the ordinance failed both the essential 
nexus and rough proportionality tests.153 The court explained its 
rationale for applying Nollan/Dolan as follows: 
The Nollan/Dolan rule governs the land use restriction chal-
lenged in the instant case, in which a property owner wishing to 
make a different use of a property – withdraw it from the rental 
market for sale or personal use – must apply to the City for a 
permit to do so. As a condition of granting the necessary Ellis Act 
permit, the Ordinance requires a monetary exaction—a substan-
tial payment, without which the property owner’s proposed new 
land use is denied and the tenant continues to occupy the unit. 
 
the property for rent or lease, except for guestrooms or efficiency units within a 
residential hotel . . . .” Id. § 7060(a). But section 7060.1 provides that 
“[n]otwithstanding Section 7060, nothing in this chapter” . . . “(c) [d]iminishes or 
enhances any power in any public entity to mitigate any adverse impact on 
persons displaced by reason of the withdrawal from rent or lease of any 
accommodations.” Id. § 7060.1(c). The San Francisco Administrative Code 
implements this power by requiring that, if the property owner “wishes to 
withdraw from rent or lease all rental units within any detached physical 
structure,” the owner must (1) serve a Notice of Termination of Tenancy on all 
tenants in possession of the unit; (2) file a Notice of Intent to Withdraw Rental 
Units with the San Francisco Rent Board; (3) withdraw their unit from the 
rental market unless the Rent Board grants permission of rescission on the 
grounds that no tenant vacated or agreed to vacate the property or that 
extraordinary circumstances exist. S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 37.9(a)(13) (2016). 
150. Levin, 71 F. Supp. at 1074. 
151. Id. at 1077. 
152. Id. at 1078. 
153. Id. at 1079–89.   
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As in Koontz, where the monetary exaction was subject to a Nol-
lan/Dolan analysis because the City commanded a monetary 
payment “linked to a specific, identifiable property interest such 
as a . . . parcel of real property,” here the Ordinance’s require-
ment of a monetary payment is directly linked to a property own-
er’s desire to change the use of a specific, identifiable unit of 
property. “Because of that direct link, this case implicates the 
central concern of Nollan and Dolan” as acutely and in the same 
way as the traditional land-use permitting context: the risk that 
San Francisco has used its substantial power under the Ellis Act 
to pursue policy goals that lack an essential nexus and rough 
proportionality to the effects of a property owner withdrawing a 
unit from the rental market.154 
Then, in response to the City’s argument that Nollan/Dolan 
“categorically” did not apply to legislatively imposed exactions155 
in light of the Ninth Circuit case of McClung v. City of Sumner,156 
the District Court stated: “Koontz abrogated McClung’s holding 
that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to monetary exactions, which 
is intertwined with and underlies McClung’s assumptions about 
legislative conditions.”157 In addition, the District Court stated 
that the post-Koontz decision by the Ninth Circuit in Horne v. 
United States Dept. of Agriculture158 “reinforces the applicability 
of the Nollan/Dolan framework to facial reviews of legislative 
exactions.”159 
 
154. Id. at 1082–83 (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 
133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013)). 
155. Id. at 1083 n.4. 
156. McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 556 U.S. 1282 (2009).  
157. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1083 n.4. 
158. 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).  
159. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1083 n.4. The District Court reasoned:  
In Horne, the Ninth Circuit reviewed and rejected a takings chal-
lenge to a Marketing Order that required raisin producers to hold 
back a certain amount of their crop from the market. There, the 
Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the Order satisfied the Nol-
lan/Dolan essential nexus and rough proportionality tests. In so do-
ing, the court explained that Dolan’s individualized review of a par-
ticular land-permit condition made sense there, because “in the land 
use context . . . the development of each parcel is considered on a 
case-by-case basis. But here, the [raisin] use restriction is imposed 
evenly across the industry; all producers must contribute an equal 
percentage of their overall crop to the reserve pool.”. The court went 
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In Levin, the District Court’s application of Nollan/Dolan to 
the plaintiffs’ takings challenge is ultimately correct, but not for 
the reasons stated in that opinion. The Nollan/Dolan test should 
apply in that case because of the substantial discretion that is 
afforded the City’s administration in subjectively exempting 
particular landlords from the payment requirements of the 2014 
Ordinance based on the specific financial condition of those 
landlords. That variance-like procedure does not appear to have 
been considered by the court in its determination of whether to 
apply Nollan/Dolan to the 2014 Ordinance. However, the 
rationales expressed by the District Court in suggesting a broad 
“applicability of the Nollan/Dolan framework to facial reviews of 
legislative exactions” is flawed for the following three (3) reasons. 
First, the Levin court’s application of Koontz to legislative 
exactions is too broad. The District Court equated the description 
in Koontz about government commands for the relinquishment of 
funds that are “linked to a specific, identifiable property interest 
such as a bank account or parcel of real property”160 with the 
2014 Ordinance’s requirement of a monetary payment that is 
“directly linked to a property owner’s desire to change the use of a 
specific, identifiable unit of property.”161 In a similar manner, the 
District Court equated the language in Koontz about “the effects 
of the proposed new use of the specific property at issue”162 with 
“the effects of a property owner withdrawing a unit from the 
rental market” in light of the 2014 Ordinance.163 Unlike the 
Supreme Court in Koontz (relying on Eastern Enterprises), the 
District Court in Levin did not focus on whether the exaction 
targeted an “identified,” “particular,” or “specific parcel of real 
property.”164 Instead, Levin focused on the effect of the exaction 
on the “choices” of the property owners that seek to use the 
properties that were impacted by the generally-applied legislative 
 
on to conclude that the Marketing Order was tailored to the govern-
ment interests under Nollan/Dolan because it varied the reserve re-
quirement annually in accordance with market conditions.  
Id. (quoting Horne, 750 F.3d at 1143-44). 
160. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 
(2013). 
161. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1083. 
162. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2600. 
163. Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1083. 
164. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599–600. 
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exaction.165 That “choices” rationale is flawed because it would 
necessarily sweep into the Nollan/Dolan analysis all “property 
taxes, user fees, and similar laws and regulations that may 
impose financial burdens on property owners.”166 Such generally-
applied financial burdens on property owners will necessarily 
have an effect on the “choices” of those property owners as to how 
they will use their property. Thus, the District Court erred in its 
application of Nollan/Dolan to the 2014 Ordinance when it 
looked to the property owners’ “choices” that are impacted by the 
legislative exaction, instead of looking to whether the exaction 
explicitly targeted an “identified,” “particular,” or “specific parcel 
of real property.”167 
Second, the Levin court’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Horne is misplaced. In Horne, the court considered a 
takings challenge to a marketing order imposed by the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture on California producers of certain 
raisins. That marketing order required that the producers divert 
a percentage of their annual crop to a reserve, and allowed the 
Secretary to impose a penalty on producers who failed to comply 
with that diversion program.168 The Ninth Circuit refused to 
apply a per se takings analysis to a legal challenge by raisin 
growers, and instead applied the Nollan/Dolan standard of 
review.169 The court reasoned that the Takings Clause affords 
less protection to personal than to real property, and that the 
 
165. The Levin court explained:  
As in Nollan, Dolan, and Horne, the challenged Ordinance requires a 
conditional exaction: the loss of substantial funds or physical control 
over the landlord’s unit. All conditionally grant a government benefit 
in exchange for the exaction, which here takes the form of the Ellis 
Act permit that the landlord must have in order to withdraw proper-
ty from the rental market. “And, critically, all” of these cases “in-
volve choice”: the Nollans could have continued to lease their proper-
ty with the existing structure, Ms. Dolan could have left her store 
and parking lot unchanged, the Hornes could have avoided the Mar-
keting Order by planting different crops, and the Levins and Park 
Lane can avoid paying the exaction by subjecting their property to 
continued occupation by an unwanted tenant.  
Levin, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 1083 (citations omitted).  
166. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601. 
167. Id. at 2599–600. 
168. Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 750 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 
2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
169. Id. at 1139–41. 
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reserve requirement “is a use restriction applying to the 
[plaintiffs] insofar as they voluntarily choose to send their raisins 
into the stream of interstate commerce.”170 The court explained 
that Nollan, Dolan and this case all involved “conditional 
exaction” and “choice.”171 However, contrary to the suggestion by 
the U.S. District Court in Levin, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Horne is not authority on the legislative exaction issue. The case 
did not involve a legislative exaction, but rather involved a 
marketing order that was made by a “Raisin Administrative 
Committee” that was comprised of “forty-seven industry-
nominated representatives” appointed by the Secretary of the 
Department of Agriculture,172 which is different both in structure 
and in function from elected legislative bodies. Also, the Ninth 
Circuit did not consider whether the Koontz analysis applies to 
legislative exactions, and did not discuss the distinctions between 
legislative and adjudicative exactions that numerous other courts 
have made. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Horne on several grounds, inter alia, 
that the marketing regulation constituted a “clear physical 
taking” that applies to personal property.173 In other words, 
Horne is a physical takings case and not a regulatory takings case 
that is subject to Nollan/Dolan review. Thus, contrary to the 
District Court’s analysis in Levin, the Horne decision by the 
Ninth Circuit does not provide any authority for the proposition 
that Nollan/Dolan applies to legislative exactions. 
Third, the Levin court’s cursory dismissal of the Ninth 
Circuit’s discussion of legislative exactions in McClung is 
incorrect. While Levin accurately noted that Koontz abrogated the 
holding in McClung that monetary exactions do not fall within 
Nollan/Dolan,174 the District Court incorrectly concluded that 
such holding in McClung is “intertwined with and underlies 
McClung’s assumptions about legislative conditions.”175 That is 
 
170. Horne, 750 F.3d at 1142. 
171. Id. at 1143. 
172. Id. at 1133 n.3.   
173. Id. at 2425–431. 
174. Levin v. City of San Francisco, 71 F. Supp. 3d 1072, 1083 n.4 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014) (citing Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 
2594 (2013)).  
175. Id. 
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because the Ninth Circuit in McClung discussed the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction apart from the “monetary” 
nature of the particular exactions in that case.176 Levin 
overlooked that discussion. Levin also avoids those cases that 
have made a distinction between legislative and adjudicative 
exactions in determining whether to apply Nollan/Dolan to 
legislative exactions, which cases (such as San Remo Hotel) were 
cited in McClung.177 
In short, while the District Court’s decision in Levin to apply 
Nollan/Dolan to the 2014 Ordinance is correct due to the 
administrative variance-type procedure that is contained within 
that ordinance, the court erred in suggesting that Koontz 
warrants a broad “applicability of the Nollan/Dolan framework 
to facial reviews of legislative exactions.” 
G. Thus, to Avoid Nollan/Dolan, a Legislative Exaction 
Must Be Generally Applied, and Must Establish a Set 
Formula that is Applied Without Any Meaningful 
Administrative Discretion 
The Nollan/Dolan test should apply to exactions that are ad 
hoc adjudicatory monetary demands on land use permittees, even 
if such demands are enacted by legislative bodies.However, 
Nollan/Dolan should not govern exactions that (1) are generally 
applied, and (2) are based on a set legislative formula that is 
applied to specific development projects without any meaningful 
administrative discretion. Those two criteria are discussed below. 
 
176. For example, the McClung decision included the following discussion:  
Next, the McClungs attempt to recast the facts as involving an indi-
vidualized, discretionary exaction as opposed to a general require-
ment imposed through legislation. The McClungs make this argu-
ment in recognition of the fact that at least some courts have drawn 
a distinction between adjudicatory exactions and legislative fees, 
which have less chance of abuse due to their general application. The 
facts do not support the McClungs falling within the former catego-
ry. All new developments must have at least 12-inch storm pipe; 
there is no evidence on the record that the McClungs were singled 
out.  
McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 1228–29 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
556 U.S. 1282 (2009) (citations omitted).  
177. Id. at 1228. 
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First, in order to avoid Nollan/Dolan, a legislative exaction 
must be generally applied. A number of lower courts have 
recognized that the political process inherent in the adoption of 
legislative exactions operates as protection against extortionate 
demands on land-use applicants.178 However, the strength of that 
“political process” rationale diminishes as the legislative exaction 
becomes more narrowly applied. Even those courts that decline to 
apply Nollan/Dolan to legislative exactions recognize that such 
exactions are not “generally applicable” if they target specific 
properties or developers.179 Indeed, the Court has emphasized the 
Takings Clause’s role “in ‘barring Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”180 Justice 
Stevens explained in his dissent in Lucas that “one of the central 
concerns of our takings jurisprudence is ‘prevent[ing] the public 
from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the 
burdens of government,’” and “[w]e have, therefore, in our takings 
law frequently looked to the generality of a regulation of 
property.”181 Accordingly, Justice Stevens noted that “[i]n 
analyzing takings claims, courts have long recognized the 
difference between a regulation that targets one or two parcels of 
land and a regulation that enforces a statewide policy.”182 
Professor Echeverria summarizes Justice Stevens’ view this way: 
“so long as regulation applies broadly across a community, there 
should be a strong presumption that the regulation represents a 
 
178. See infra Part III.B.  
179. For example, in McClung, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused 
to apply the Nollan/Dolan standard to a city ordinance’s “across-the-board” 
requirement that all new developments include a minimum of 12-inch storm 
pipes. 548 F.3d at 1228. When the plaintiffs attempted to recast the facts as 
involving “an individualized, discretionary exaction as opposed to a general 
requirement imposed through legislation,” the court explained: “The facts do not 
support the [plaintiffs] falling within the former category. All new developments 
must have at least 12-inch storm pipe; there is no evidence on the record that 
the [plaintiffs] were singled out.” Id. at 1228–29.   
180. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
181. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071–72 (1992) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (alteration in original); see also id. at 1072 n.7 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“This principle of generality is well rooted in our broader 
understandings of the Constitution as designed in part to control the ‘mischiefs 
of faction.’”). 
182. Id. at 1073 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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legitimate outcome of the political process rather than the high 
jacking of the process by some special interest.”183 That view is 
consistent with the California Supreme Court in San Remo Hotel 
and the Oregon Supreme Court in Rogers Machinery, discussed 
above. Thus, in order for a legislative exaction to not be an 
“extortionate demand” like the ad hoc administrative exaction in 
Koontz that required the application of Nollan/Dolan, the 
legislative exaction must be generally applicable and must not 
single out a few projects or properties (i.e., “some people”).184 
Second, in order to prevent a legislative exaction from 
becoming an “extortionate demand” that is subject to 
Nollan/Dolan, there must not be any meaningful discretion in 
the application of the exaction to specific projects or properties.185 
The Court’s concern regarding administrative discretion is 
evident in Justice Alito’s explanation in Koontz that “land-use 
permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion 
that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because 
the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that 
is worth far more than property it would like to take.”186 The 
relevance of administrative discretion is also apparent in the 
exchange during oral argument between Petitioner’s counsel and 
Justice Sotomayor. The Justice asked: “So what happens in just – 
when the legislature passes a development fee? Are you, now, 
 
183. John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. OF 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 193 (2005). Professor Eagle similarly notes that “fine-
grained ordinances setting out requisites for development” may lack judicial 
deference because they would constitute “spot zoning.” Eagle, supra note 115, at 
24. 
184. In most cases the difference between the two should be apparent. 
Professor Ilya Somin describes the distinction between “broad-based property 
taxes or user fees that apply to all property owners, or to all users of a particular 
public service, and narrowly targeted exactions that single out individual 
landowners or small groups” as follows: “[a]lthough the precise line between the 
two may be elusive, most real-world cases are likely to fall clearly on one side or 
the other of this continuum.” Ilya Somin, Two Steps Forward for the “Poor 
Relation” of Constitutional Law: Koontz, Arkansas Game & Fish, and the Future 
of the Takings Clause, CATO SUPREME CT. REV. 215, 239 (2013). 
185. See, e.g., Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 694 
(Colo. 2001) (“. . .the District Manager [of a sanitation district] validly calculated 
[developers’] specific assessment according to a publicly promulgated conversion 
framework.”). 
186. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 
(2013) (emphasis added).   
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saying that’s subject to Nollan and Dolan, too?”187 Petitioner’s 
counsel responded: “If the legislation requires an agency who 
processes the permit to impose a fee in exchange for a permit – 
again, within the land-use context, we are not talking about 
taxes, homeowners’ fees, we are talking within the discretionary 
land-use process – that is imposed there, then the risk of coercion, 
undue influence, and the like arise, and Nollan and Dolan should 
apply.”188 Thus, even Petitioner’s counsel in Koontz recognized a 
connection between “the risk of coercion, undue influence, and the 
like” and the “discretionary” land-use process. That is because the 
existence of administrative discretion in the application of a 
legislative exaction raises the same potential for coercion and 
“extortionate demands” as an adjudicative exaction. 
For example, the Texas Supreme Court applied 
Nollan/Dolan to a legislative exaction, inter alia, because of the 
administrative discretion that was allowed in the application of 
that exaction to specific projects. In Town Of Flower Mound v. 
Stafford Estates Ltd Partnership, the Texas court found no 
meaningful distinction between the conditions imposed in Nollan 
and Dolan (which involved “general authority taking into account 
individual circumstances”) and the requirement in a town 
ordinance that conditioned the approval of a subdivision 
development on the general requirement that all developers 
construct concrete streets.189 However, the ordinance contained 
an exception to that development requirement if the Town’s 
Council found and determined “that such standards work a 
hardship” due to the “costs” and “other related factors” resulting 
from the imposition of that requirement in individual cases.190 
The Town denied the request by the plaintiff developer for an 
exception to that requirement, even though the Town “had 
exercised its discretion to grant exceptions to other developers on 
a project-by-project basis.”191 The Texas court explained the 
 
187. Transcript of Petitioner Oral Argument at 58, Koontz v. St. Johns 
River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013) (No. 11-1447).   
188. Id. (emphasis added).   
189. Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 
620, 641 (Tex. 2004). 
190. Id. at 624 (quoting FLOWER MOUND, TEX., CODE, ch.12 § 4.04(a) (1994) 
(now codified at CODE § 90-301 (2002)).   
191. Id. at 624. 
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relevance of that discretionary element in the application of the 
Nollan/Dolan test: 
The Town was authorized to grant, and did grant, exceptions to 
the general requirement that roads abutting subdivisions be im-
proved to specified standards. Stafford applied for an exception 
and was refused, but the Town nevertheless considered whether 
an exception was appropriate. [¶] The Town argues that if the 
government is to be held to the stricter Dolan standard because it 
tries to tailor general requirements to individual circumstances - 
that is, because it sometimes grants variances - it will be less in-
clined to do so, thereby inflicting one-size-fits-all shoes onto very 
different feet. But it is precisely for this reason that we decline to 
adopt a bright-line adjudicative/legislative distinction.192 
The application of Nollan/Dolan in Town of Flower Mound there-
fore depended, in part, on the fact that the Town’s administrative 
staff had the discretion to decide who should have to follow the 
otherwise generally-applied legislative exaction.193 That applica-
tion of Nollan/Dolan to a legislative exaction is consistent with 
the rationale in San Remo Hotel, where the California Supreme 
Court declined to apply Nollan/Dolan to a legislative in lieu fee 
 
192. Id. at 641–42 (quoting Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 
835 n.4 (1987)). 
193. In Twin Lakes Development Corporation v. Town of Monroe, the Court 
of Appeals of New York similarly applied Nollan/Dolan to a legislative exaction 
that had a built-in discretionary administrative component. There, the New 
York court affirmed summary judgment against a developer that brought a 
takings challenge against a town code requirement that an applicant for a 
subdivision permit pay a per-lot in lieu fee where the town’s planning board 
determines that parkland dedication is not appropriate. Twin Lakes Dev Corp v. 
Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821, 822 (N.Y. 2003). Without any discussion as to 
whether Nollan/Dolan should even apply in that legislative context, the court 
simply adjudicated the case under that standard. Id. The Plaintiff developer 
argued that the fee constituted an unconstitutional taking, in part, because the 
amount of the fee was not based on an individualized consideration under Dolan 
of the recreational needs generated by its subdivision plan and thus is not 
roughly proportional to those needs. Id. at 824. The court rejected that 
argument because the planning board made a finding that led to the imposition 
of the in-lieu fee rather than a parkland dedication, and such findings “reflect 
the individualized consideration of the project’s impact contemplated by Dolan.” 
Id. at 825. 
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as there “is no meaningful government discretion [that] enters in-
to either the imposition or the calculation of the in lieu fee.”194 
Thus, the general consensus appears to be that the 
Nollan/Dolan test should apply to a legislative exaction where a 
project applicant/property owner is treated uniquely either in the 
imposition of the exaction, or in the exception from the exaction. 
Both situations involve administrative discretion that carry the 
threat of “extortionate demands,”195 even though the exaction is 
initially created in the legislative process. However, legislative 
exactions that do not include any meaningful discretion in their 
administration (either in their application or in an exception to 
their application) should not be governed by Nollan/Dolan. 
IV. THE DEFAULT PENN CENTRAL ANALYSIS 
SHOULD NOT GOVERN GENERALLY APPLIED 
AND DISCRETIONLESS LEGISLATIVE 
EXACTIONS 
A. Penn Central is the Default Standard of Review for 
Takings Cases 
In various cases, the Court has made general statements to 
the effect that the multi-factored analysis in Penn Central is the 
“default” test that determines whether a regulatory action 
constitutes a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment. For example, 
in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,196 Justice O’Connor explained in a 
concurring opinion: “Our polestar instead remains the principles 
 
194. San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 104 (Cal. 2002); 
see, e.g., Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 696 (Colo. 2001) 
(Nollan/Dolan does not apply to Colorado state’s sanitation plant investment 
fee where “[t]he General Assembly authorized the fee and the District assessed 
it under the terms of a publicly promulgated conversion schedule”; and 
“[n]either the promulgation of the conversion schedule, nor the calculation of the 
[individual property owner’s] [fee] assessment by the assigned administrative 
official, constituted a discretionary adjudicative activity.”). 
195. It could be argued that a “legislative exaction” that involves 
administrative discretion is not really a “legislative exaction” at all. However, it 
is important to interpret legislative exactions in light of the degree of 
administrative discretion that is built into the legislation in order to address the 
concern of some courts that there may not be a clear “adjudicative/legislative 
distinction” for purposes of determining the proper standard of judicial review. 
See, e.g., Town of Flower Mound, 133 S.W.3d at 642.   
196. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
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set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern 
partial regulatory takings.”197 The dissent in Koontz similarly 
recognized that “[c]laims that government regulations violate the 
Takings Clause by unduly restricting the use of property are 
generally ‘governed by the standards set forth in Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. New York City,’”198 and that the “function of Penn 
Central” is to “address excessive regulatory burdens on land 
use.”199 The Lingle Court more specifically explained that, 
outside the “two relatively narrow categories” of a physical 
invasion of property and of a deprivation of all economically 
beneficial use of property under Lucas, and other than the 
“special context of land-use exactions” in Nollan/Dolan, 
“regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set 
forth in Penn Central . . . .”200 In light of such statements, it is not 
surprising that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 
an unreported decision in 2010 that “the proper framework” for 
analyzing whether a “generally applicable development fee” was a 
taking is “the fact-specific inquiry developed by the Supreme 
Court in Penn Central . . . .”201 
 
197. Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
198. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005)). 
199. Id. at 2604 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
200. Lingle, at 538; see id. at 539 (the Penn Central factors “have served as 
the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall 
within the physical takings or Lucas rules”); id. at 548 (“[A] plaintiff seeking to 
challenge a government regulation as an uncompensated taking of private 
property may proceed under one of the other theories discussed above—by 
alleging a ‘physical’ taking, a Lucas-type ‘total regulatory taking,’ a Penn 
Central taking, or a land-use exaction violating the standards set forth in 
Nollan and Dolan.”); see also Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. 
Ct. 511, 518 (2012) (“[W]e have drawn some bright lines, notably, the rule that a 
permanent physical occupation of property authorized by government is a 
taking. So, too, is a regulation that permanently requires a property owner to 
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses of his or her land. But aside from the 
cases attended by rules of this order, most takings claims turn on situation-
specific factual inquiries.” (citing, inter alia, Penn Central v. City of New York, 
438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978)); Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617 (citing Penn Central for the 
proposition that “[w]here a regulation places limitations on land that fall short 
of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have 
occurred, depending on a complex of factors . . . .”). 
201. Mead v. City of Cotati, No. 09-15005, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 15201, at 
*4–5 (9th Cir. July 22, 2010) (citing McClung v. City of Sumner, 548 F.3d 1219, 
1225 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1282 (2009)). 
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B. However, the Penn Central Analysis Should Not 
Govern Generally-Applied Legislative Exactions 
Despite those general statements by the Court, legislative 
exactions should not be governed by the Penn Central analysis for 
the following three (3) reasons. 
First, because the Penn Central analysis is “situation-
specific”202 and “essentially ad hoc,”203 it is not designed to 
address generally-applied legislative exactions. For example, 
Lingle explained that the “primary” Penn Central factor is “[t]he 
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, 
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations.”204 Thus, just as 
the “individualized determination” under Nollan/Dolan renders 
that standard inapplicable to generally-applied legislative 
exactions for the reasons discussed above,205 so too the “situation-
specific” analysis under Penn Central makes the latter ill-suited 
for judicial review of legislative exactions of general applicability. 
Second, the Penn Central analysis is too inherently uncertain 
and gives rise to too many “vexing subsidiary questions”206 to be 
practical in the context of legislative exactions. Professor Eagle 
notes that the Penn Central doctrine “remains under-theorized, 
subjective, with its factors mutually referential, and unable to 
provide a reliable guide to courts or litigants,” and that the 
doctrine “has become a compilation of moving parts that are 
neither individually coherent nor collectively compatible.”207 For 
example, in Koontz, Justice Alito expressed relief that the Court 
 
202. Ark. Game & Fish, 133 S. Ct. at 518.  
203. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).  
204. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (emphasis added); see also Palazzolo, 533 
U.S. at 633–34 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he regulatory regime in place at 
the time the claimant acquires the property at issue” is relevant to the “degree 
of interference with investment-backed expectations” element of the Penn 
Central analysis. Also, “[e]valuation of the degree of interference with 
investment-backed expectations instead is one factor that points toward the 
answer to the question whether the application of a particular regulation to 
particular property ‘goes too far.’”) (emphasis added). 
205. See infra Part III.D.  
206. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538–39 (citing Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18, 632-
34 (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
207. Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings 
Test, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 601, 601-02 (2014). 
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“need not apply Penn Central’s ‘essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquir[y],’ at all, much less extend that ‘already difficult and 
uncertain rule’ to the ‘vast category of cases’ in which someone 
believes that a regulation is too costly.”208 Justice Alito’s 
comment suggests that the Court would be reluctant to apply the 
“difficult and uncertain rule” in Penn Central to legislative 
exactions. That makes sense because judicial standards of review 
should be applied in a manner that affords clarity to legislatures 
in how to enact land use exactions that are constitutionally valid. 
Just as legislation must have sufficient clarity so as to give fair 
warning to the public as to what activities are prohibited in order 
to pass constitutional muster,209 so too should judicial standards 
of review give clarity to legislatures where the constitutional lines 
are drawn for legislative exactions. Just like the Court 
purposefully “construe[s] [ambiguous] statutes [as necessary] to 
avoid constitutional questions,”210 so too the Court should apply 
non-ambiguous standards of review to legislative exactions so as 
to allow legislatures to avoid unconstitutional takings. Thus, the 
Court should provide a non-ambiguous standard of review to 
determine whether generally applied and discretionless exactions 
constitute takings under the Fifth Amendment. The Penn Central 
analysis does not provide such a standard. 
Third, the prevalence of legislative exactions is so widespread 
that the Court should avoid its usual predisposition to “generally 
eschew[] any “ ‘set formula’ “ for determining how far is too 
 
208. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 
(2013) (quoting E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 542 (1998) (opinion of 
Kennedy, J.)) (emphasis added).   
209. See generally United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266–67 (1997). 
210. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 328 (2010); see 
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 
508 U.S. 602, 628–29 (1993) (“It is a hoary one that in a case of statutory 
ambiguity, ‘where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise 
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid 
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.’ ‘Federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of 
their constitutionality. “When the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in 
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a 
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of 
the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”‘“ (citations 
omitted)); see also Reg’l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974) 
(“[W]hen a statute is ambiguous, ‘construction should go in the direction of 
constitutional policy.’”) (citation omitted)). 
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far.”211 Generally, the Court “resist[s] the temptation to adopt per 
se rules in our cases involving partial regulatory takings, 
preferring to examine ‘a number of factors’ rather than a simple 
‘mathematically precise’ formula.”212 Penn Central, itself, is based 
on the Court’s decision to eschew “any ‘set formula’ for 
determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require that economic 
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the 
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated 
on a few persons.”213 However, that judicial policy of avoiding 
formulaic takings rules should not govern legislative exactions. 
As the dissent in Koontz pointed out, the constitutional standard 
of review applied to land use exactions impacts “every decision by 
every local government to require a person seeking a permit to 
pay or spend money.”214 What is at stake, according to the Koontz 
dissent, is the potential that the Court could end up diminishing 
“the flexibility of state and local governments to take the most 
routine actions to enhance their communities . . . .”215 The 
widespread impact of the constitutional standard of review in the 
legislative takings context, coupled with Justice Kennedy’s 
observation that “[c]ases attempting to decide when a regulation 
becomes a taking are among the most litigated and perplexing in 
current law,”216 collectively means that widespread constitutional 
litigation can be expected in the legislative exactions context if 
the Penn Central analysis is applied. Thus, the appropriate 
standard of judicial review for generally-applied and 
discretionless legislative exactions should not be Penn Central, 
but should be a “set formula.” 
Accordingly, the Penn Central “factors” analysis is 
inappropriate in the legislative exaction context. Instead, a set 
formula for legislative exactions is warranted. Indeed, Professor 
 
211. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (quoting 
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
212. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 326 (2002). 
213. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 
590, 594 (1962)). 
214. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2608 
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
215. Id. at 2607 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
216. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in judgment and dissenting in part). 
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Echeverria points out that per se rules in takings cases assist 
local agencies in drafting legislation: “Even from a perspective of 
defenders of government regulatory authority, this approach had 
the potential benefit of identifying actions that would be safely 
immune from takings liability – assuming these per se tests came 
to define not only the grounds, but also the outer limits, of 
takings liability.”217 The Court should design a ‘set formula’ 
standard of review that constitutes both the “grounds” and “outer 
limits” of constitutional takings in the legislative exactions 
context. As discussed below, the reasonable relationship test that 
has been adopted by several states constitutes such a standard of 
review. 
V. A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TEST SHOULD 
GOVERN GENERALLY-APPLIED AND 
DISCRETIONLESS LEGISLATIVE EXACTIONS 
Since neither the Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny test, nor 
the “default” Penn Central analysis, should govern generally-
applied and discretionless legislative exactions, as explained 
above, the Court should therefore fashion a “takings” standard of 
review that is tailored to such legislative exactions. Such a 
standard must satisfy the two fundamental “takings” criteria 
explained in Lingle. Prior to Lingle, the Court had declared in 
Agins v. Tiburon218 that government regulation of private 
property “effects a taking if [such regulation] does not 
substantially advance legitimate state interests . . . .”219 However, 
the Court reversed course in Lingle, concluding that “the 
‘substantially advances’ formula announced in Agins is not a 
valid method of identifying regulatory takings for which the Fifth 
Amendment requires just compensation.”220 According to Lingle, 
the formula in Agins “prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due 
process, not a takings, test,”221 examines the validity of a 
 
217. Echeverria, supra note 171, at 173. 
218. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
219. Id. at 260. 
220. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532, 536–45 (2005). 
221. Id. at 540. See also id. (Agins formula “was derived from due process, 
not takings, precedents”); id. at 542 (“The ‘substantially advances’ formula 
suggests a means-ends test: It asks, in essence, whether a regulation of private 
property is effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose. An inquiry of 
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regulation in a manner that “is logically prior to and distinct from 
the question whether a regulation effects a taking”222, and does 
not involve the key examination of whether the governmental 
regulation forces “some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as 
a whole.”223 In rejecting the Agins formula, the Court in Lingle 
outlined the two key elements that must be included in any 
“takings” standard of review: “[T]he ‘substantially advances’ 
inquiry [in Agins] reveals nothing about the [1] magnitude or 
character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon 
private property rights. Nor does it provide any information about 
[2] how any regulatory burden is distributed among property 
owners.”224 The Court repeated: “A test that tells us nothing 
about the actual burden imposed on property rights, or how that 
burden is allocated, cannot tell us when justice might require 
that the burden be spread among taxpayers through the payment 
of compensation.”225 Thus, the standard of review that the Court 
should apply to legislative exactions must address those two 
elements. 
In determining the proper standard of review for legislative 
exactions, the Supreme Court should consider the approaches 
taken by various states. That is what the Court did when it 
developed the analogous “roughly proportional” test in Dolan.226 
 
this nature has some logic in the context of a due process challenge, for a 
regulation that fails to serve any legitimate governmental objective may be so 
arbitrary or irrational that it runs afoul of the Due Process Clause. But such a 
test is not a valid method of discerning whether private property has been 
‘taken’ for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.” (citation omitted)). 
222. Id. at 543. 
223. Id. at 536 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960)). 
224. Id. at 542 (emphasis in original). The court further explained that “the 
‘substantially advances’ inquiry before us now is unconcerned with the degree or 
type of burden a regulation places upon property . . . .” Id. at 547. 
225. Id. at 543. 
226. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389–91 (1994) (“Since state 
courts have been dealing with this question a good deal longer than we have, we 
turn to representative decisions made by them.”); see generally Koontz v. St. 
Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2602 (2013) (“Numerous 
courts—including courts in many of our Nation’s most populous States—have 
confronted constitutional challenges to monetary exactions over the last two 
decades and applied the standard from Nollan and Dolan or something like it”); 
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 839 (1987) (Court’s conclusion that 
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This author suggests that the Court adopt a “reasonable 
relationship” test like that which has been applied to legislative 
exactions in the states of California, Colorado, and Ohio. 
In California, the Mitigation Fee Act provides a statutory 
reasonable relationship requirement that applies to legislative 
exactions.227 The statute requires that a local agency must 
determine “‘how there is a ‘reasonable relationship’ between the 
proposed use of a given exaction and both ‘the type of 
development project’ and ‘the need for the public facility and the 
type of development project on which the fee is imposed.’”228 The 
California Supreme Court summarized that statutory test as 
follows: “fees must bear a reasonable relationship, in both 
intended use and amount, to the deleterious public impact of the 
development.”229 Indeed, Penn Central appeared to suggest such 
a test when the U.S. Supreme Court declared that “a use 
restriction on real property may constitute a ‘taking’ if not 
reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public 
purpose.”230 
 
the California Coastal Commission’s imposition of a permit condition cannot be 
treated as an exercise of its land-use power “is consistent with the approach 
taken by every other court that has considered the question, with the exception 
of the California state courts” (citing numerous state authorities)).  
227. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66001(a)–(b), 66005(a), 66006(c) (West 2016). 
228. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 436–37 (Cal. 1996) (Arabian, J., 
plurality opinion) (quoting CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 66001(a)(3)–(4)) (emphasis in 
original); see also Homebuilders Ass’n of Tulare/Kings Ctys., Inc. v. City of 
Lemoore, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 14 (2010) (“The Mitigation Fee Act requires the 
local agency to identify the purpose of the fee and the use to which the fee will 
be put. The local agency must also determine that both ‘the fee’s use’ and ‘the 
need for the public facility’ are reasonably related to the type of development 
project on which the fee is imposed. In addition, the local agency must 
‘determine how there is a reasonable relationship between the amount of the fee 
and the cost of the public facility or portion of the public facility attributable to 
the development on which the fee is imposed.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
229. San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002); 
see also Homebuilders Ass’n of Tulare/Kings Ctys., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 15 
(“[B]efore imposing a fee under the Mitigation Fee Act, the local agency is 
charged with determining that the amount of the fee and the need for the public 
facility are reasonably related to the burden created by the development 
project.”). 
230. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978). 
Cf. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (“[U]nless the permit condition serves the same 
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a 
valid regulation of land use by ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’”) (quoting 
J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (1981). 
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In Colorado, a similar statutory reasonable relationship test 
has been applied. For example, in Krupp v. Breckenridge 
Sanitation District, the Colorado Supreme Court held that a 
legislatively imposed sanitation plant investment fee was not 
governed by Nollan/Dolan, but was instead governed a state 
statute that required that “the amount of the fee must be 
reasonably related to the overall cost of the service.”231 Under 
that reasonableness standard, “[m]athematical exactitude is not 
required, however, and the particular mode adopted by the 
governmental entity in assessing the fee is generally a matter of 
legislative discretion.”232 Judicial review under that standard 
presumed that the governmental body “may rationally 
distinguish between different types of projects in setting its 
rates,” and that the courts “will not set aside the methodology 
chosen by an entity with ratemaking authority unless it is 
inherently unsound.”233 
The Ohio Supreme Court similarly applied a two-part 
reasonable relationship test to a legislative exaction in Dayton 
(even though the court incorrectly considered that test to be an 
administration of Nollan/Dolan).234 The Ohio court explained 
that, under that test, “the city must first demonstrate that there 
is a reasonable relationship between the city’s interest in 
constructing new roadways and the increase in traffic generated 
by new developments,” and if such a reasonable relationship 
exists, “it must then be demonstrated that there is a reasonable 
relationship between the impact fee imposed by [the city] and the 
benefits accruing to the developer from the construction of new 
roadways.”235 
Those various forms of the reasonable relationship test 
applied in California, Colorado, and Ohio avoid the shortcomings 
 
231. 19 P.3d 687, 693–94 (Colo. 2001) (emphasis added). 
232. Id. at 694. 
233. Id. In Krupp, the court found that the fee at issue satisfied that 
“reasonably related” standard: “We conclude that the [fee] is established by 
legislative authority, and is reasonably related to the specific government 
service of providing wastewater collection and treatment to new developments 
within the District. It rationally differentiates between different classes of 
buildings based upon anticipated peak wastewater flows per unit.” Id. 
234. See infra Part III.D. 
235. Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 
729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000). 
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of the Nollan/Dolan and Penn Central standards of review in the 
legislative exaction context. The reasonable relationship test not 
only avoids the judicial interference with local land-use decisions 
that so troubled the dissent in Koontz, but it also alleviates the 
Court’s concern that land-use exactions may go “too far” and 
become “extortionate demands” on property owners. 
Furthermore, the reasonable relationship test satisfies the 
two elements that Lingle required for any “takings” standard of 
review. First, the reasonable relationship test considers the 
actual burden imposed on property rights. For example, under 
the California Mitigation Fee Act, the fee determination process 
by the legislative body “will necessarily involve predictions 
regarding population trends and future building costs,” and 
therefore “it is not to be expected that the figures will be 
exact.”236 On review, courts “will not concern themselves with [a 
local] agency’s methods for compiling and evaluating scientific 
data.”237 Instead, a court “must be able to assure itself that before 
imposing the fee the [local agency] engaged in a reasoned 
analysis designed to establish the requisite connection between 
the amount of the fee imposed and the burden created.”238 Thus, 
 
236. Shapell Indus., Inc. v. Governing Bd. of the Milpitas Unified Sch. 
Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 818, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
237. Id. at 835. 
238. Id. at 827. See Homebuilders Assn. of Tulare/Kings Ctys. v. City of 
Lemoore, 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d 7, 15-16 (“If such a fee is challenged, the local agency 
has the burden of producing evidence in support of its determination. The local 
agency must show that a valid method was used for imposing the fee in 
question, one that established a reasonable relationship between the fee charged 
and the burden posed by the development. [¶] [¶] [¶] In general, the imposition 
of various monetary exactions, such as special assessments, user fees, and 
impact fees, is accorded substantial judicial deference. In the absence of a 
legislative shifting of the burden of proof, a plaintiff challenging an impact fee 
has to show that the record before the local agency clearly did not support the 
underlying determinations regarding the reasonableness of the relationship 
between the fee and the development. [¶] Accordingly, the local agency has the 
initial burden of producing evidence sufficient to demonstrate that it used a 
valid method for imposing the fee in question, one that established a reasonable 
relationship between the fee charged and the burden posed by the development. 
If the local agency does not produce evidence sufficient to avoid a ruling against 
it on the validity of the fee, the plaintiff challenging the fee will prevail. 
However, if the local agency’s evidence is sufficient, the plaintiff must establish 
a requisite degree of belief in the mind of the trier of fact or the court that the 
fee is invalid, e.g., that the fee’s use and the need for the public facility are not 
reasonably related to the development project on which the fee is imposed or the 
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the local legislative body in California has “the initial burden of 
producing evidence of the reasonableness of the relationship 
between the fee charged and the burden posed by the 
development,” and the party challenging the fee has “the burden 
of proving that the record before the [local body] did not support 
the [local body’s] underlying determinations.”239 Second, the 
reasonable relationship test satisfies the second element in Lingle 
regarding how regulatory burdens are distributed among 
property owners. For example, when it adopted that test in the 
Mitigation Fee Act, the California Legislature was motivated, in 
part, by the development community’s concern “that local 
agencies were imposing development fees for purposes unrelated 
to development projects.”240 Thus, the public policies advanced by 
 
amount of the fee bears no reasonable relationship to the cost of the public 
facility attributable to the development.” (citations omitted)). 
239. Id. at 16; see, e.g., Cresta Bella, LP v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 160 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 437, 447–49 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2013) (school impact fee 
imposed on a residential development project involving the demolition of an 
existing apartment complex and construction of a new, larger apartment 
complex held invalid under the “reasonable relationship” standard in section 
66001, subdivision (a), of the Act to the extent the fees were imposed on 
preexisting square footage, because the school district failed to show that 
replacement of the preexisting square footage would generate new students); 
Home Builders Assn. of Tulare/Kings Ctys., 112 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 23–24 
(legislatively imposed fire protection impact fee on the west side of the city was 
valid under the Act because the city’s analysis showed that additional facilities 
were needed to serve the new development on the west side; but the same fee for 
the east side of the city was invalid under the Act because the existing facilities 
“are already adequate to continue to provide the same level of service” and “the 
new development will not burden the current facilities”). 
240. Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 436 (Cal. 1996) (Arabian, J., 
plurality opinion) (quoting Centex Real Estate Corp. v. City of Vallejo, 24 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 48, 49-50 (1993), citing S. Comm. on Local Govt., analysis of AB 1600, 
1987–1988 Reg. Sess. (1987), at 1). The Mitigation Fee Act arose out of a joint 
legislative hearing, the purpose of which was: 
[T]o generate ideas for an equitable means of financing infrastruc-
ture. Chairman Cortese opened the hearing with the comment that 
he anticipated a positive discussion “that points us towards a legisla-
tive solution to our current public facility financing problems.” Cor-
tese said that any fees imposed by local governments should be “in 
the spirit of Proposition 13” and not exceed the cost of the service 
provided . . . . Senator Bergeson also expressed concern that the cur-
rent reliance on developer fees may unfairly shift the cost of growth 
to new homebuyers, but a limitation on these fees may unintention-
ally limit the growth that some communities desire. 
54https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/1
 2017] LET’S BE REASONABLE 291 
the California Legislature in the reasonable relationship test 
mirror the two “realities of the permitting process” that undergird 
the Court’s decision in Koontz.241 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Significant uncertainty exists after Koontz as to whether the 
U.S. Supreme Court will extend the heightened scrutiny of the 
Nollan/Dolan test to legislatively-imposed monetary exactions. As 
Justice Thomas advised in early 2016, the Court must act at “the 
earliest practicable opportunity”242 to address that uncertainty 
and to remove what Justice Kagan calls “a cloud on every decision 
by every local government to require a person seeking a permit to 
pay or spend money.”243 By applying the rationales expressed in 
Koontz, and by taking note of how the majority of lower courts 
have addressed the issue, the Court should find that neither the 
heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan, nor the Penn Central 
factored analysis, should govern legislative exactions that (1) are 
generally applied, and (2) are based on a set legislative formula 
that provides no meaningful discretion to administrators in its 
application to specific properties. Legislative exactions that 
satisfy those two criteria should be governed by the reasonable 
relationship test adopted by the state governments, like that in 
California, Colorado, and Ohio. Application of such a reasonable 
relationship test addresses the Court’s concerns that land-use 
exactions do not go “too far,” that local governments do not make 
 
S. COMM. ON LOCAL GOV’T & S. SELECT COMM. ON PLANNING FOR CALIFORNIA’S 
GROWTH, “DEVELOPER FEES: REARRANGING WHO PAYS FOR WHAT”: A BACKGROUND 
STAFF REPORT FOR THE JOINT HEARING, 1 (1986); see Shapell Indus., 1 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 827 (describing the Act as establishing the following policies: “While it is 
‘only fair’ that the public at large should not be obliged to pay for the increased 
burden on public facilities caused by new development, the converse is equally 
reasonable: the developer must not be required to shoulder the entire burden of 
financing public facilities for all future users. ‘[T]o impose the burden on one 
property owner to an extent beyond his [or her] own use shifts the government’s 
burden unfairly to a private party . . . .’ It follows that facilities fees are justified 
only to the extent that they are limited to the cost of increased services made 
necessary by virtue of the development.” (citation omitted)). 
241.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2594–
96 (2013). 
242. Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 929 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of cert.). 
243. Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
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“extortionate demands” on property owners, and that 
development projects pay for the external costs they create. 
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